摘要
引入机动车碳税政策判断企业进行低碳技术创新以及政府监管和消费者低碳出行的临界条件,对其中的3个主体进行分析,借助演化博弈的方法,构建企业、政府和消费者之间的三方博弈模型,探讨了不同主体之间策略选择的影响,并运用Matlab 2016软件对推论结果进行了仿真实验。仿真结果表明:机动车碳税政策可以促进企业进行低碳技术创新,同时促进消费者低碳出行;企业的骗补行为将影响自身进行低碳技术创新的积极性,也会导致政府加强对企业的监管力度;政府分摊给消费者的骗补罚金可以有效促进消费者低碳出行,但分摊比例过大会影响自身监管积极性。
This paper attempts to introduce the vehicle carbon tax policy to determine the critical conditions for low-carbon technology innovation by enterprises, government regulation and low-carbon travel by consumers. At the same time, the three subjects among them are analyzed. A three-party game model of enterprises, the government and consumers is constructed with the help of the evolutionary game approach to analyze the influence of strategy selection among different subjects and to conduct simulation experiments on the inferred results by using Matlab 2016 software. The simulation results show that the vehicle carbon tax policy can promote enterprise low-carbon technology innovation and low-carbon travel by consumers at the same time. Fraudulent subsidies by enterprises will affect their own motivation to carry out low-carbon technology innovation, and will also lead the government to strengthen the regulation of enterprises. The government’s share of penalties to consumers will be effective in promoting their low-carbon travel, but too much allocation will affect its own regulatory incentives.
作者
霍红
杨若冰
詹帅
HUO Hong;YANG Ruobing;ZHAN Shuai(Management School,Harbin University of Commerce,Harbin 150028,China)
出处
《重庆理工大学学报（自然科学）》
CAS
北大核心
2023年第1期232-243,共12页
Journal of Chongqing University of Technology：Natural Science
基金
黑龙江省社会科学基金项目(20GLB114)
黑龙江省社会科学基金智库项目(21ZK032)
哈尔滨商业大学青年创新人才项目拔尖人才项目(2020CX47)
黑龙江省哲学社会科学规划项目(21GLC187)。
关键词
机动车碳税政策
低碳技术创新
演化博弈
vehicle carbon tax policy
low-carbon technology innovation
evolutionary game
