摘要
考虑政府采取碳税或碳排放权交易机制两种碳排放政策,基于供应链视角,构建港口与航运企业减排博弈模型,系统分析港航企业减排策略选择和政府碳排放政策选择问题。结果表明:当航运企业减排成本小于港口协助减排成本时,港航企业选择分散决策减排力度最优;反之,选择集中决策减排力度最优。在集中决策情形下,港航供应链减排力度与航运企业减排成本和港口协助减排成本成反比,和市场容量成正比;在分散决策情形下,港口协助减排成本不会影响港航供应链减排力度。在碳定价较低时,港航企业选择分散决策定价最优,选择集中决策利润最优;在碳定价较高时,则相反。无论政府采取何种碳排放政策,港航企业选择集中决策并且政府对港口减排进行补贴,会使港航供应链整体利润与减排力度同时达到最优。在未来碳定价大幅提升的情况下,政府采取碳排放权交易机制推动港航企业减排效果更好。
Considering the two carbon emission policies that the government currently adopts: carbon tax or carbon trading scheme, this paper proposes the emission reduction game model based on the perspective of supply chain, and analyzes the emission reduction strategy choice for port and shipping enterprises and the government’s carbon emission policy choice. The results show that when the cost of emission reduction for shipping enterprises is less than the cost of port, the port and shipping enterprises would choose decentralized decision-making to make the best intensity of emission reduction;otherwise, they would choose centralized decision-making. In centralized decision-making, the intensity of emission reduction of port and shipping supply chain is inversely proportional to the cost of emission reduction of port and shipping enterprises, and proportional to the market capacity. In decentralized decision-making,the cost of emission reduction of port will not affect the intensity of emission reduction of port and shipping supply chain. In the case of lower carbon pricing, if the port and shipping enterprises choose decentralized decision-making,they will get the optimal pricing. And if they choose centralized decision-making, they will get the optimal profit. But in the case of higher carbon pricing, the opposite result will be obtained. Regardless of what carbon emission policy the government adopts, if port and shipping enterprises choose centralized decision-making and the government subsidizes port emission reduction, the overall profit and the emission reduction intensity of port and shipping supply chain will simultaneously reach the optimal values. In the case of a substantial increase in carbon pricing in the future, it is better to adopt carbon trading scheme for government to promote the effect of emission reduction of port and shipping enterprises.
作者
梁晶
张霖
刘禹轩
LIANG Jing;ZHANG Lin;LIU Yu-xuan(Transportation Engineering College,Dalian Maritime University,Dalian 116026,Liaoning,China)
出处
《交通运输系统工程与信息》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第1期39-47,共9页
Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金(71974023)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(3132019302)
国家社科基金重大研究专项(19VHQ012)。
关键词
水路运输
减排策略
博弈论
港航企业
碳税
碳排放权交易机制
waterway transportation
emission reduction strategy
game theory
port and shipping enterprises
carbon tax
carbon trading scheme
