摘要
为研究制造商的入侵策略、电商平台的市场信息分享策略对供应链各成员的最优决策和利润的影响,构建了不同策略下的Stackelberg博弈模型。研究结果表明,市场规模较高时,仅当市场预期高度背离实际规模,制造商放弃入侵更有利,其余情况下,制造商更愿意选择入侵;对于电商平台,若市场规模较低,隐藏信息能够获得更高的市场份额,即不分享是占优决策,若市场规模较高,一定条件下,分享信息能带来更高的收益;市场预期越高,制造商的利润越高,若制造商的市场预期与实际市场规模差距越大,平台能够相应地提高佣金收入,从而实现共赢。
The encroachment strategies of manufacturers and the market information sharing strategies of e-commerce platforms was studied.In addition,it also was discusses the impact of these strategies on the profits of each member.The results show that when the market size is high and the market expectation is highly deviated from the actual scale,it is more advantageous for the manufacturer to give up the encroachment.In other cases,the manufacturer is more willing to choose invasion.For the platform,if the market size is low,concealing information is always superior due to the ability to occupy a higher market.If the market size is high,sharing information can bring higher profits under certain conditions.The higher the market expectation,the higher the manufacturer′s profit.If the manufacturer′s market expectation is inconsistent with the actual market,the platform can achieve a win-win situation through commission revenue.
作者
王有浩
闵杰
WANG You-hao;MIN Jie(School of Economics and Management,Anhui Jianzhu University,Hefei 230601,China;School of Mathematics&Physics,Anhui Jianzhu University,Hefei 230601,China)
出处
《青岛大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2023年第1期71-78,共8页
Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金(批准号:71571002)资助。
关键词
平台供应链
信息不对称
制造商入侵
platform supply chain
information asymmetry
manufacturer encroachment
