摘要
定向增发解禁效应不但能冲击金融市场稳定性,还会加剧经理人避险行为,并最终抑制定向增发企业整体的研发投入水平、提高定增企业选择短期研发项目的比例,这一影响将严重阻碍企业创新高度。深度挖掘定向增发解禁效应对企业研发项目策略选择演化的影响机制,已成为预测定向增发市场研发潜能、激活定向增发市场活力以及完善定向增发规则的重要问题。考虑到定向增发企业策略选择满足生物“趋利避害”的行为规律,本文构建基于Moran过程的定向增发企业研发策略演化博弈模型,系统研究了投资者情绪、系统风险、同业竞争及政府补贴等内外部因素对定向增发企业研发策略选择的影响,并通过引入攻击-防御竞争模型刻画了基于投入水平的研发项目同业竞争力,进一步完善了研发项目的收益预测模型。研究发现:首先,当投资者对短期研发项目和长期研发项目策略的收益估计均低于预期时,定向增发解禁效应最为显著,定向增发企业此时也更偏好短期研发项目;当投资者对两策略的收益估计均高于预期时,定向增发解禁效应的影响水平最弱,此时定向增发企业具有选择长期研发项目的基础。其次,在受外部因素影响较大的弱选择条件下,短期研发项目策略和长期研发项目策略的演化固定概率相近,投资者决策具有高度不确定性,定向增发解禁效应也较为显著;在受项目获利性影响较大的强选择条件下,定向增发企业更倾向于项目的获利水平,此时定向增发企业在政策扶持水平较高的情况下,敢于布局和实施长期战略项目。再次,参与同业竞争的企业数量越大,定向增发企业越偏好选择短期研发项目,定向增发解禁效应也越显著;定向增发股份中大股东或股东关联方的占比越高,则定向增发解禁效应的影响水平越弱、定向增发企业选择长期研发项目的概率越大。最后,政府单一的补贴策略对激励企业参与“卡脖子”技术攻坚战的作用有限,应从培养和培训专门技术人才、稳定金融市场、控制恶意资本进入、增加定向增发解禁周期弹性、提高定向增发股份中大股东或股东关联方占比、差异化布局研发项目等方面同时入手。研究揭示了考虑定向增发解禁效应的企业研发项目选择的演化规律,分析了多种核心影响因素对该演化的作用机理,同时也为政府提供了相关决策建议。
The effect of lifting the ban on private placement can not only impact the stability of the financial market,but also aggravate managers’risk aversion behavior.Such lifting also inhibits the overall R&D investment of private placement enterprises and increase the proportion of fixed-income enterprises choosing short-term R&D projects,which will seriously hinder the innovation of enterprises.It has become an important issue to deeply explore the influencing mechanism of the effect of lifting the ban on private placement on the enterprise R&D project selection evolution strategy,predict the R&D potential of the private placement market,activate the vitality of the private placement market and improve the rules of private placement.Considering that the strategy selection of private placement enterprises meets the biological behavior law of“seeking advantages and avoiding disadvantages”,this paper constructed an evolutionary game model of private placement enterprises’R&D strategy based on Moran process,systematically studied the influence of internal and external factors such as investor sentiment,system risk,horizontal competition and government subsidies on the R&D strategy selection of private placement enterprises,and described the horizontal competitiveness of R&D projects on the basis of the input level by introducing an attack-defense competition model,further improving the revenue forecasting model of R&D projects.The results showed that firstly,when estimated investors’income of short-term R&D projects and long-term R&D projects were lower than expected,the effect of lifting the ban on private placement was the most significant,and private placement enterprises preferred short-term R&D projects at this time;when estimated investors’income of the two strategies were higher than expected,the effect of lifting the ban of private placement was the weakest,and there was a basis for private placement enterprises to choose long-term R&D projects.Secondly,under the condition of weak selection,which was greatly influenced by external factors,the fixed probability of evolution of the short-term R&D project strategy and the long-term R&D project strategy was similar,investors’decision-making was highly uncertain,and the effect of private placement lifting the ban was also significant.Under the strong selection condition which was greatly influenced by the profitability of the project,the private placement enterprises were more inclined to the profitability of the project.At this time,the private placement enterprises dared to lay out and implement long-term strategic projects with a high level of policy support.Thirdly,the greater the number of enterprises participating in horizontal competition,the more private placement enterprises preferred to choose short-term R&D projects,and the more significant the effect of private placement was.The higher the proportion of major shareholders or shareholders’related parties in private placement shares,the weaker the effect of lifting the ban of private placement,and the greater the probability that private placement enterprises chose long-term R&D projects.Finally,the government’s single subsidy strategy has limited the effect on encouraging enterprises to participate in the technical battle curbing the key technology.Therefore,it is necessary to start from the aspects of cultivating and training specialized technical talents,stabilizing the financial market,controlling the entry of malicious capital,increasing the flexibility of the ban-lifting period of private placement,increasing the proportion of major shareholders or shareholders’related parties in private placement shares,and differentiating the layout of R&D projects.The research reveals the evolution law of enterprise R&D project selection considering the effect of private placement,analyzes the mechanism of various core influencing factors on this evolution,and also provides relevant suggestions for decision-making of the government.
作者
李德龙
张莹
王瑞永
LI De-long;ZHANG Ying;WANG Rui-yong(College of Business Administration,Inner Mongolia University of Finance and Economics,Hohhot,China,010070;Business School,Sichuan University,Chengdu,China,610064)
出处
《财经理论研究》
2023年第2期101-112,共12页
Journal of Finance and Economics Theory
基金
内蒙古自治区自然科学基金项目(2022QN07003)
祖国北疆资源利用与环境保护协调发展院士专家工作站开放课题(2021NCDYSZJGZZ-001)
内蒙古自治区高等学校创新团队发展计划(NMGIRT2202)。
关键词
定向增发
解禁效应
研发项目
演化博弈
Moran过程
private placement
effect of lifting the ban
R&D projects
evolutionary game
Moran process
