摘要
从民用航空运输安全需求出发,建立了民航监管机构、航空公司、旅客的三方演化博弈模型,分别分析了不同情境下各参与主体的稳定演化策略。研究结果表明:当航空公司选择不违规策略的概率提高时,监管机构选择严格监管的趋势逐渐放缓;当航空公司选择违规策略的概率较大时,旅客开始不会选择该航空公司出行,但由于选择其他方式或者其他航空公司出行的成本逐渐增加,超出旅客心理承受能力,旅客又被迫选择该航空公司出行;航空公司的策略选择与监管机构的惩罚力度有关,当监管机构加大对违规航司的惩罚力度时,能更快地敦促航空公司趋向不违规进行生产活动,但是,惩罚应该设置一个上限,过高的惩罚会导致航空公司难以达到演化稳定状态。
Starting from the safety needs of civil air transport,this paper establishes a tripartite evolution game model of civil aviation regulators,airlines and passengers,and analyzes the stable evolution strategies of each participant in different scenarios.The results of the study show that when the probability of airlines choosing a non-compliance strategy increases,the trend of regulators choosing strict supervision gradually slows down;When the probability of an airline choosing a violation strategy is larger,passengers will not choose the airline to travel at first,but with the advancement of time,due to the increase in the cost of choosing other ways or other airlines to travel,exceeding the passenger^psychological capacity,passengers are gradually forced to choose the airline to travel;Airlines'strategic choices are related to the severity of penalties imposed by regulators,which can more quickly urge airlines to move toward non-compliance with production activities,but the penalties should be capped,and excessive penalties will make it difficult for airlines to achieve evolutionary stability.
作者
许雅玺
张一凡
XU Ya-xi;ZHANG Yi-fan(Civil Aviation Flight University of China,Guanghan 618000,C加no)
出处
《航空计算技术》
2023年第2期6-10,共5页
Aeronautical Computing Technique
基金
国家自然科学基金与民航基金联合重点项目资助(U2033214)
国家重点研发计划项目资助(2018YFB1601200)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目面上项目资助(J2022-048)
中国民用航空飞行学院研究生教研项目资助(XKJ2021-8)
大学生创新创业项目资助(S202210624230)。
关键词
民航安全
三方演化博弈
动态监管
演化稳定分析
aviation safety
tripartite evolutionary game
dynamic supervision
evolutionary stability analysis
