摘要
本文以我国《破产法》和《物权法》的实施为准自然实验情境,使用破产风险作为分组变量构造双重差分模型,考察债权人保护的强化如何影响公司风险承担意愿及其经济后果。研究发现:债权人保护强化显著抑制公司风险承担意愿,公司风险承担意愿平均下降约为均值的25%,上述结果在排除替代性解释以及系列稳健性测试后仍然成立。拓展性检验发现:上述关系在法律执行效率更高地区的公司更显著。经济后果检验发现:伴随着债权人保护趋于严格,公司风险承担意愿的降低显著削弱了其产品市场绩效。本文研究测度了债权人保护对债务人风险承担意愿的净效应,拓展并深化了实施《破产法》和《物权法》产生的经济效应,对评估法律实施效果以及完善相关法律法规具有一定的参考价值。
Modern economics research demonstrates that protecting real rights is an important cornerstone for promoting economic growth and financial market development.The promulgation and implementation ofReal Rights Law of the People's Republic of China(hereinafter referred to as the“Real Rights Law”)marks an increase in real rights protection in China.However,the literature mainly studies the economic effects of the Real Rights Law from the perspective of the expanded list of potential collateral and constraints on corporate finance,ignoring how it strengthens creditor protections.Meanwhile,the implementation of Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China(hereinafter referred to as the“Bankruptcy Law”)on June 1,2007,established and improved legal protections for creditors.Against this background,understanding how changes in the creditor protection regime affect the credit market and stable development of the real economy is extremely important.Creditor protection has long been an important issue in corporate finance.The literature about the effects of creditor protection on corporate economic behavior comprises two main categories:The first studies how enhancing creditor protection affects borrowing behavior from creditors'perspective and finds that an increase in the level of creditor protection eliminates credit market frictions and enhances creditors'willingness to take risks,thus increasing the availability of corporate finance.The other category examines the effects of creditor protection enhancements from the debtors'perspective.The main findings are that creditor protection enhancements increase the risk of transferring control to creditors,which reduces debtors'willingness to take risks and ultimately has a negative effect on a firm's product market performance.The essence of risk-taking is that managers are good at grasping investment opportunities and bearing investment risks to obtain excess profits.This is the driving force behind the sustainable development of enterprises and an important factor in improving enterprise value.Companies that are willing to take risks and pursue good investment opportunities ultimately promote long-term economic growth.The implementation of China's 2007 Bankruptcy and Real Rights Laws provide a research opportunity to identify the relationship between creditor protection and corporate risk-taking.Using the 2007 Bankruptcy and Real Rights Laws as a quasi-natural experiment,we construct a sample of firms with high bankruptcy risk and study the effects of creditor protection on corporate risk-taking using the difference-in-differences method.After excluding alternative explanations,this study finds that strong creditor protections significantly inhibit corporate risk-taking.Further tests show that this effect is more pronounced for those in regions with more efficient law enforcement.The economic consequences test shows that the reduction in a firm's willingness to take risks as creditor protections become more stringent significantly weakens its product market performance.The academic contributions of this study are summarized as follows.First,from the risk-taking perspective,this paper extends the research on the economic consequences of creditor protection by verifying the impact of strengthened creditor protections on corporate risk-taking and identifying its mechanism.Second,using a difference-in-differences model and taking the 2007 implementation of China's Bankruptcy and Real Rights Laws as a quasi-natural experiment,this paper identifies the causal relationship between creditor protections and corporate risk-taking.
作者
王红建
吴静桦
曹瑜强
WANG Hongjian;WU Jinghua;CAO Yuqiang(School of Finance,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics;School of Accounting,Hunan University of Technology and Business;School of Accounting,Guangdong University of Foreign Studies)
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第2期189-206,共18页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71962020、72072079)
湖南省自然科学基金青年项目(2022JJ40133)的资助。
关键词
债权人保护
风险承担
准自然实验
双重差分模型
Creditor Protection
Risk-taking
Quasi-natural Experiment
Difference-in-Differences Model
