摘要
中国经济高质量发展需要有效市场与有为政府的有机结合,这也对政府应当在哪些方面“有所为”和“有所不为”提出了更高要求。现有研究主要从企业生产经营视角,检验了国有企业放权改革中政府干预行为减少的经济后果,明确了政府在企业生产经营方面应当“有所不为”。本文则从企业信息生产视角,研究了政府控制链监管对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现:政府通过股权控制链强化对国有企业信息生产的监管抑制了股价崩盘风险,支持了政府控制链监管效应假说;政府透过股权控制链对企业的信息生产动机、信息生产行为和信息披露质量实施监管能够抑制股价崩盘风险;国家审计监督和政府控制链监管存在着相互替代的关系;政府通过股权控制链对国有企业信息生产实施内部监管存在有效范围,这种监管的有效性主要体现在控制链层级不超过三级的国有企业中。上述监管效应具有异质性,在分析师预测偏差较大、管理者股权激励水平较低的样本中,上述监管效应更明显。与以往有关政府干预在国有企业生产经营中主要引致的负面效应不同,政府通过股权控制链强化信息生产监管对国有企业更多发挥着正面效应。这一发现为中国经济转型时期加快政府职能转变提供了实证层面的证据。
Since the reform and opening up,the Chinese government has carried out decentralization reform to improve the operating efficiency of state-owned enterprises.Based on the trade-off theory of political cost and agency cost,the research on decentralization reform focuses on the diversified influence of government on enterprises'production and operation through the path of state-owned equity.In general,most studies on how government intervention affects the production and operation of enterprises believe that the government should reduce the intervention of state-owned enterprises and reduce the political burden of state-owned enterprises,so as to enhance their operating autonomy and thus improve the operating efficiency.However,while the existing research extensively discuss how government intervention affects the production and operation of state-owned enterprises,they ignore the research on the supervision effect of government on enterprise information production through equity path.The former focuses on how to increase corporate value,while the latter focuses on how to return stock prices to value.The low information production efficiency of state-owned enterprises will lead to the failure of the timely transmission of negative news to the outside world,leading to the upward deviation of the external evaluation of corporate value.When the stock price bubble caused by concealing bad news accumulates to a certain extent,itwill lead toa serious stockprice crash.From the perspective of enterprise operating activities,existing studies have tested the economic consequences of the reduction of government intervention in the reform of state-owned enterprises decentralization,and made it clear that the government should“leave something to be done”in the operating activities of enterprises.From the perspective of enterprise information production,this paper has several findings.First,the strengthening of government supervision over equity control chain reduces the risk of stock price collapse,supporting the hypothesis of government supervision effect over control chain.Second,the government realizes the supervision by influencing the motivation,the behavior and the result of enterprise information production.Third,there is a substitute relationship between the government's supervision of stateowned enterprises through providing state audit and its supervision of state-owned enterprises through ownership path.Fourth,there is an effective scope for the government to implement internal supervision on the information production of state-owned enterprises through the equity path,and the effectiveness of this supervision is mainly reflected in the stateowned enterprises whose control chain length is not more than three.Fifth,the government supervision effect is heterogeneous,which is more obvious in the samples with large bias of analysts'forecast and low level of managers'equity incentive.This paper argues that,different from the negative effects mainly played by government intervention in the operating activities of state-owned enterprises,the government's control of enterprise information production through equity control chain is more reflected in the positive supervision effect,and the government should“do something”in the supervision of enterprise information production.The findings of this paper provide empirical evidence for how to realize the policy vision of accelerating the transformation of government functions in the period of economic transformation in China.Based on the above research,this paper provides the following policy suggestions:First,the government should strengthen the control chain supervision,stimulating the institutional superiority of modern state-owned enterprises with Chinese characteristics.Second,to achieve optimal regulation,the government should deepen the coordination and integration of internal and external governance systems.Third,any supervision method has its limitations,which requires the state-owned assets supervision department to further innovate supervision methods,improving the diversity and complementarity of supervision methods.
作者
谢获宝
郭汝婷
XIE Huo-bao;GUO Ru-ting(Economics and Management School,Wuhan University,Wuhan,Hubei,430072,China)
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第3期125-147,共23页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“营改增对制造业服务化升级的溢出效应及其传导机制研究”(71803146)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“去杠杆影响企业风险承担的经济后果、机制路径及优化策略研究”(19YJA630093)。
关键词
政府控制链监管
信息生产
股价崩盘风险
government control chain supervision
information production
stock price crash risk
