摘要
引入前景理论构建了东北三省绿色住宅开发中3个主体的演化博弈模型,通过MATLAB仿真分析了政府、房地产企业与消费者在不同条件下的演化决策行为。研究表明:降低企业开发绿色住宅的增量成本,提高企业开发绿色住宅的增量收益,提高政府对企业不开发绿色住宅的单位惩罚系数,提高消费者购买绿色住宅的收益,保持消费者购买绿色住宅的支付成本在一定范围内更有利于复制动态系统达到采取措施,开发绿色住宅,购买绿色住宅的理想稳定状态。
The prospect theory is introduced to construct the evolutionary game model of the three subjects in the green housing development in the three northeastern provinces,and this paper analyzes the evolutionary decision-making behaviors of the government,real estate enterprises and consumers under different conditions through MATLAB simulation.Research indicates reducing the incremental cost of developing green housing for enterprises,increasing the incremental income of developing green housing for enterprises,increasing the unit penalty coefficient of government on enterprises without developing green housing,improving the income of consumers buying green housing,and keeping the payment cost of consumers buying green housing within a certain range,which is more conducive to the game to the reasonably stable status of copying dynamic system to take measares,developing green housing and purchasing green houses.
作者
周鲜华
单晶
ZHOU Xianhua;SHAN Jing(School of Management,Shenyang Jianzhu University,Shenyang 110168,China)
出处
《沈阳建筑大学学报（社会科学版）》
2023年第2期153-160,共8页
Journal of Shenyang Jianzhu University:Social Science
基金
辽宁省教育厅基本科研项目(LJKR0211)。
关键词
绿色住宅
前景理论
演化博弈
仿真分析
green house
prospect theory
evolutionary game
simulation analysis
