摘要
农村土地收益分成制度变迁的动力源于基层实践和政府推动,表现出经济学意义上的演化特征。本文从当事人的个体认知出发,采用演化思想,构建从个体认知到外部规则的涵盖微观-中观-宏观的多层次动态演化分析框架,结合土地非农利用方面的制度改革实践,对土地收益分成制度变迁过程进行了分析。结果表明,农民在演化过程中扮演了重要角色,他们的个体认知(微观层面)形成了制度变迁的起点,在外部环境的作用下基于其自身利益在中观层面——集体内部形成“内部规则”,政府在此过程中的选择性接纳和“有为”设计,促成了外部规则与内部规则的协调互动,最终形成宏观层面的制度变迁。总体来看,收益分成逐渐向农民倾斜,集体作为特殊的当事人,在此过程中其收益来源发生了转变,从最根本的所有者权益到使用者权益再到通过提供经营、服务获得收益及博弈获得了更多收益,参与收益分成的方式更为丰富。在未来趋势方面,制度变迁需要外部环境的变化作为契机,才能刺激个体认知的表达,会向着完善集体和农民权利以及增加其收益的方向演进,形成内部规则,集体产权也更加明晰。但并非所有的内部规则都会转为外部规则,只有在不威胁城市土地市场和保证政府利益的前提下,政府才会协调外部规则,逐渐放权让利,最终实现制度变迁。
The dynamics of the change of the rural land revenue sharing system originate from grassroots practice and government promotion, and exhibit the characteristics of evolution in the sense of economics. This paper adopts the idea of evolution from individual cognition to external rules, and constructs a multi-level dynamic evolutionary analysis framework covering micro-medium-macro from individual cognition to external rules. This paper analyses the evolutionary process of the land revenue sharing system in the light of the institutional reform practices in the area of non-farm land use. The results show that farmers play an important role in the evolutionary process, and that their individual perceptions(at the micro level) form the starting point for institutional change. The “internal rules” are formed at the meso level-within the collective-based on their own interests, in response to the external environment. The government's selective acceptance and ‘active' design in this process has led to a harmonious interaction between external and internal rules, and ultimately to institutional change at the macro level. In general, the share of proceeds has gradually shifted in favor of farmers, and the collective, as a special party, has changed its source of income in the process, from the fundamental owner's rights and interests to user's rights and interests to more income through the provision of business, services and gaming, and more ways to participate in the share of proceeds. In terms of future trends, institutional change requires changes in the external environment in order to stimulate the expression of individual perceptions, which will evolve in the direction of improving collective and peasant rights and increasing their benefits, resulting in internal rules and greater clarity of collective property rights. However, not all internal rules will be transformed into external rules, and only if they do not threaten the urban land market and guarantee the government's interests will the government coordinate external rules and gradually devolve power and benefits, eventually achieving institutional change.
作者
王珏
马贤磊
石晓平
WANG Jue;MA Xianlei;SHI Xiaoping
出处
《公共管理与政策评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第3期70-85,共16页
Public Administration and Policy Review
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目《农地产权制度改革、基层治理对水土资源利用效率的影响——基于江苏河北和新疆的分析》(72173065)
国家自然科学基金面上项目《“三权分置”政策实施机制及其对耕地质量保护行为的影响:基于产权与治权结合视角》(72273064)
高等学校学科创新引智计划资助项目(B17024)。
关键词
制度变迁
收益分成
集体
内部规则
外部规则
Institutional Change
Income Share
Rural Collective
Internal Rules
External Rules
