摘要
中央环保督察体现了中国纵向环境治理的制度优化与工具创新。通过构建“中央政府-地方政府-污染企业”演化博弈模型,分析影响各主体策略选择的关键因素,并借助系统仿真模拟,刻画主要参数对系统稳定性和收敛趋势的影响,对中央环保督察影响大气污染治理的作用机制进行研究。研究结果表明:(1)当前中央环保督察能够有效激励污染企业进行整改,但对地方政府监管策略的激励作用有待进一步提高;地方政府会将自身责任向污染企业转移,趋向于选择不监管策略。(2)环保督察成本会对督察制度效果产生影响,督察成本过高,地方政府和污染企业容易选择大气污染治理不监管和不整改策略。(3)相比于大气环境质量考核指标和环境税费,提高不监管策略的处罚可以更有效地实现地方政府监管和污染企业整改的策略组合。进一步,从推动督察体系实现常态化建设、探索客观有效的环境政策工具、构建协同参与的环境监管体系等方面提出政策建议。
The central environmental protection inspector embodies the system optimization and tools innovation of China's vertical environmental governance.Based on the evolutionary game model of vertical governments and pollution enterprises,the key factors influencing the strategy selection of each subject is analyzed,and with the help of system simulation,the influence of main parameters on the system stability and convergence trend is depicted,and the effect of central environmental protection inspector on air pollution governance is studied.The main results show that:(1) At present,the central environmental protection inspector can effectively motivate polluting enterprises to carry out rectification,but the incentive effect on the local governments' regulatory strategies need to be further improved;local governments tend to opt for non-regulatory strategies by shifting responsibility to polluters.(2) The cost of inspector will have an impact on the effectiveness of the central environmental protection inspector system.If the cost of inspector is too high,it is easy for local governments and polluting enterprises to choose non-regulatory strategies and non-rectification strategies for air pollution control.(3) Compared with the evaluation index of atmospheric environment quality and environmental taxes and fees,improving the punishment of non-regulatory strategies can more effectively achieve the combination of local governments' regulatory strategies and the polluting enterprises' rectification strategies.Further,policy recommendations are put forward from the aspects of promoting the normalization of the inspector system,exploring objective and effective environmental policy tools,and building a collaborative environmental supervision system.
作者
张明
孙欣然
宋妍
ZHANG Ming;SUN Xin-ran;SONG Yan(School of Economics and Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221116,China;School of Economics and Management,Xidian University,Xi’an 710126,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第4期171-182,共12页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(72173094,71874189,72174195)
江苏省社会科学基金资助项目(20JD012)
中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(XJS220609)。
关键词
大气污染治理
三方演化博弈
中央环保督察
环境政策工具
air pollution control
tripartite evolutionary game
central environmental protection inspector
environmental policy tools
