摘要
构建下游由部分对成本类型不敏感的忠诚顾客与部分对成本类型敏感的一般顾客组成的消费者群体,上游由具有两种成本类型(高成本与低成本)的单一企业构成的两级供应链体系,在完全信息与不完全信息两种信息结构下分别探究企业与消费者之间的策略型竞争博弈问题,研究企业忠诚顾客的比例对高成本类型企业进行企业成本信号传递决策的影响。研究发现:完全信息下,不论企业成本类型是高还是低,忠诚顾客比例越大,对企业越有利;不完全信息下,忠诚顾客比例越大,高成本企业越倾向于分离均衡;忠诚顾客比例越大对低成本类型企业越有利,对高成本类型企业却并不总是越有利;只有当忠诚顾客比例高于阀值时,价格扭曲降低程度带来的积极作用大于忠诚顾客搭便车行为,忠诚顾客比例越高对高成本类型企业越有利。
The interaction between a firm and consumers is studied that is consisted with some loyal customers who are not sensitive to the firm's cost types and some general customers are the opposite.The firm can be either high cost type or low,however,the consumers cannot observe the firm's exact type,which is private information.The high type firm can signal its type through pricing and quality strategy.It is found that under the symmetric information,increasing proportion of loyal customers makes both type firms better off;under the asymmetric information,the low cost type firm can still benefit from an increasing proportion of loyal customers,whereas,the high cost type firm may be worse off.In addition,the high cost type firm will be more intend to separating rather than pooling with the increasing proportion of loyal customers.Finally,when the proportion of loyal customers is higher than a threshold,the positive effect of price distortion is greater than the negative effects of loyal customers.
作者
周建亨
李颖潇
ZHOU Jian-heng;LI Ying-xiao(Glorious Sun School of Business&Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第4期275-286,共12页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71872036)
国家自然科学基金资助重点项目子项目(71832001)
教育部人文社会科学资助项目(18YJA630153)
上海市社会科学项目(2017BGL018)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2232018H-07)。
关键词
顾客忠诚
信号传递
不完全信息
customer loyalty
signaling
asymmetric information
