摘要
监管处罚作为审慎监管的重要组成部分,对防范化解银行个体风险和系统性风险均具有重要作用。本文基于2007—2020年中国银行业微观数据,考察了银行业监管处罚对银行个体风险的影响。研究发现:监管处罚显著抑制了违规银行风险,有利于维护银行系统稳定。特别是在2015年《中国银行业监督管理委员会行政处罚办法》修订后,对银行风险防范起到重要作用。在此基础上,本文从时间和空间两个维度分析了监管处罚有效性,发现监管处罚的风险抑制作用不仅具有长期效应,还能起到“杀鸡儆猴”的警示效应。进一步研究表明,银行的规模和国有属性会弱化监管处罚的风险抑制作用,而在存款保险制度实施之后这种弱化作用有所减小。此外,搭配经济类处罚或纳入机构为主体的处罚措施实际效果会更好。但监管处罚也存在对高风险银行处罚不足,而对低风险银行处罚过度的问题。本文丰富了监管处罚有效性的内涵,为建立防范化解银行风险的长效机制提供了理论支持。
In recent years, with the continuous deepening of China's financial system reform, the competition in the banking industry has intensified under the impact of interest rate marketization and the digital economy, leading to frequent occurrences of partial risk events. These violations involve a large number of enterprises and banks, not only increasing regulatory difficulties but also amplifying the systemic risk contagion of the banking industry. As an important tool and means of micro-prudential supervision, do regulatory penalties play a role in maintaining financial safety and stability? Specifically, can regulatory sanctions taken to rectify financial disorder reduce banking risks? If so, does this effect exist in the long term or does it have a warning effect on non-violating banks? Additionally, what differentiated effects do regulatory penalties have on banking risks, such as for banks of different sizes, ownership types, and types of penalties? Against the backdrop of preventing and resolving financial risks, systematically addressing these two questions not only helps to broaden the understanding and comprehension of the effectiveness of regulatory penalties, but also holds important theoretical and practical implications for enhancing China's prudential regulatory framework.To answer these questions, this paper constructs a manually collected dataset of bank regulatory penalties. Based on panel data of China's banking industry from 2007 to 2020, this paper uses System GMM estimation method to evaluate the causal effect of regulatory penalties on banking risks. The research results show that regulatory penalties can reduce banking risks and have a risk-inhibiting effect, which is robust to various sensitivity tests. At the same time, regulatory penalties are effective, with long-term and spillover effects. Furthermore, this paper also finds that large and state-owned banks weaken the effect of regulatory penalties, which has decreased after the implementation of the deposit insurance system. In addition, regulatory penalties that include economic sanctions or include institutions as the subject of penalties have better effects. Finally, regulatory penalties also suffer from the problem of insufficient penalties for high-risk banks and excessive penalties for low-risk banks, resulting in an asymmetric risk-reducing effect.This paper's contribution is reflected in three aspects. First, this paper expands theoretically the connotation of the effectiveness of regulatory penalties. This paper studies the long-term and warning effects of regulatory penalties from the two dimensions of time and space and reveals the differentiated effects of regulatory penalties from multiple perspectives, providing theoretical support for establishing a long-term mechanism for preventing and resolving banking risks. Second, this paper provides empirical evidence of the regulatory penalties' risk governance role by comprehensively examining China's regulatory penalties' effect on banking risks. Finally, by better eliminating endogeneity problems with external shocks revised by the 2015 Administrative Penalty Measures of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, this paper effectively identifies the causal relationship between regulatory penalties and banking risks and expands the understanding of the revision effects of regulatory penalty policies.This paper's research results provide useful policy references for regulatory agencies to better design regulatory measures. Firstly, regulatory agencies need to pay attention to the punitive and warning effects of regulatory penalties on banks, further strengthen real-time monitoring of banks' regulatory violations, and exert the regulatory correction function to guide banks to operate prudently and comply with regulations. Secondly, although regulatory penalties have a risk-mitigating effect, the size of assets and state ownership may weaken its risk-mitigating effect, and implicit guarantees still exist. Therefore, in the process of formulating regulatory measures, regulatory agencies need to fully consider the heterogeneity of various types of banks. Finally, regulatory agencies can avoid regulatory evasion problems and play a regulatory deterrent role by adopting a combination of multiple types, multiple entities, and multiple dimensions of penalty measures.
作者
明雷
黄远标
杨胜刚
MING Lei;HUANG Yuanbiao;YANG Shenggang(College of Finance and Statistics,Hunan University;School of Finance,Nankai University;Business School,Hunan University)
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第4期114-132,共19页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71903051)、国家自然科学基金重点项目(71850006)和国家自然科学基金重大项目(71790593)的资助
国家社会科学基金重大项目(19ZDA103)。
关键词
监管处罚
银行风险
审慎监管
异质性
Regulatory Penalties
Bank Risk
Prudential Regulation
Heterogeneity
