摘要
上市公司审计意见购买行为不仅严重降低信息披露质量,掩盖企业的违规舞弊行为,而且弱化了审计监督的治理功能,扭曲资本市场资源配置的效率与效果。本文从分析师关注的视角,考察分析师行为对上市公司审计意见购买的影响。结果发现,分析师关注显著强化了上市公司的审计意见购买动机。具体而言,随着分析师关注度的提高,分析师关注的治理效应表现为“弱化监督效应”和“强化压力效应”,短期资本市场压力加剧了管理层的机会主义行为。进一步的研究发现,分析师声誉会强化“压力效应”,促使上市公司购买清洁审计意见。本文有助于更加全面地认识和评价分析师的治理作用,将分析师关注这一重要的外部压力假说纳入审计意见购买动因的分析框架中,指出了分析师关注的不良经济后果,为完善分析师的治理职能提供理论支持。
Audit opinions purchase not only hinders the quality of information disclosure and masks fraudulent activities,but also undermines the oversight function of audit supervision and distorts the efficiency and effectiveness of resource allocation in the capital market.This study aims to explore the impact of analysts'behavior on the audit opinions purchase by listed companies.Results show that analysts'attention significantly strengthens the motivation for purchasing audit opinions.Specifically,increased analysts'attention weakens the supervision effect but strengthens the pressure effect on governance.Short-term market pressures exacerbate opportunistic management behavior.Furthermore,the research finds analyst reputation strengthens the pressure effect and encourages listed companies to purchase clean audit opinions.The study contributes to understanding and assessing the governance role of analysts comprehensively.By incorporating the external pressures of analysts'attention into the analysis framework of purchasing motivation for audit opinions,this study highlights the adverse economic consequences of analysts'attention and provides theoretical support for improving the governance function of analysts.
作者
杨州
刘胜题
Zhou Yang;Shengti Liu(School of Management,University of Shanghai for Science&Technology)
关键词
分析师关注
审计意见购买
监督效应
压力效应
Analyst Attention
Audit Opinions Purchase
Supervisory Effect
Pressure Effect
