摘要
农村生态环境治理是乡村振兴战略中的重要任务,仅依靠单一治理主体无法有效解决广大农村的环境治理需求,多方协同合作是实现生态治理成功的关键.构建地方政府、村镇企业和村民的三方演化博弈模型,分析各主体策略选择的演化稳定性、演化博弈系统均衡点的稳定性及各主体利益诉求对三方策略选择的影响关系.通过数值仿真发现,地方政府加强补贴、罚款政策力度均有助于促进村镇企业积极减排、村民主动参与环境治理行为,但罚款力度大小并不影响村镇企业最终的策略选择;利用两种情景仿真结果来探讨农村生态环境常态化治理,为实现农村生态环境常态化协同治理的理想模式提供理论参考.
Rural ecological environment governance is an important task in the rural revitalization strategy.Only relying on a single governance body cannot effectively solve the environmental governance needs of the vast rural areas.Multi-party cooperation is the key to the success of ecological governance.This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among local governments,village enterprises and villagers,and analyzes the evolutionary stability of each participant's strategy choice,the stability of the equilibrium point in the game system,and the infuence of each subject's interest demands on the tripartite strategy choice.Through numerical simulation,it is found that the local government's strengthening of subsidies and fine policies can help promote the active emission reduction of village and town enterprises and the active participation of villagers in environmental governance,but the size of the fine does not affect the final strategy choice of village and town enterprises.The simulation results are combined with actual cases to discuss the normalized governance of the rural ecological environment,and provide a theoretical reference for realizing the ideal model of the normalized collaborative governance of the rural ecological environment.
作者
李玲燕
赵景阳
LI Ling-yan;ZHAO Jing-yang(School of Management,Xi'an University of Architecture and Technology,Xi'an 710055,China)
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
2023年第7期89-101,共13页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(72104191)。
关键词
农村生态环境
三方主体
演化博弈
仿真分析
rural ecological environment
tripartite subject
evolutionary game
simulation analysis
