摘要
在城郊土地征收中,基层政府制定何种委托代理合约来约束和激励村干部的行为和努力程度将会直接影响土地征收效率和土地增值收益分配。通过构建事前村干部筛选模型和事中村干部激励模型得到如下结论:城郊具有资源密集、基层政府委托事项多和土地征收可能性大的特点,基层政府倾向于选择“能人”“狠人”等类型的高效率候选人担任村干部;基层政府满意的候选人可以利用保留效用的私人信息特性从基层政府获得更高的报酬,但报酬提升空间受到潜在竞争者与基层政府满意的候选人担任村干部的成本差额的限制;当只将征地完成量作为村干部代理工作绩效的考核依据时,村干部获得的期望报酬与基层政府的惩罚能力负相关,与村干部的风险规避程度正相关;当将征地完成量和冲突量共同作为村干部代理工作绩效的考核依据时,村干部通过努力获得好结果的难度越大,取得好结果获得的报酬越多,没有取得好结果受到的惩罚越少;在基层政府不具备惩罚能力时,基层政府要支付给村干部更多的报酬。
In suburban land expropriation,what kind of agency contract the grassroots governments set to constrain and motivate the behaviors and efforts of village cadres will directly affect the efficiency of land expropriation and the distribution of land value-added benefits.By constructing a village cadres selection model beforehand and an incentive model throughout the process for village cadres,it is found that suburban villages have the characteristics of resource density,multiple entrusted tasks from grassroots governments,and high possibility of land expropriation.Grassroots governments tend to choose efficient candidates such as“capable”and“ruthless”ones to serve as village cadres;candidates that grassroots governments are satisfied with can use the private information characteristic with retaining utility to obtain higher rewards from grassroots governments,but the space for reward increase is restricted by the cost variance between potential competitors and candidates that grassroots governments are satisfied with as village cadres;when only the completion of land expropriation is used as the evaluation basis for village cadres'agency work performance,the expected reward received by village cadres is negatively correlated with the punishment ability of grassroots governments,and positively correlated with the degree of risk avoidance of village cadres;when the amount of land expropriation completed and the amount of conflicts are jointly used as the evaluation basis for village cadres'agency work performance,the greater the difficulty for village cadres to achieve good results through hard work,the more reward they receive for achieving good results,and the lower the punishment they receive for not achieving good results;when grassroots governments do not have the ability to punish,they need to pay more reward to village cadres.
出处
《常州大学学报（社会科学版）》
2023年第4期62-74,共13页
Journal of Changzhou University:Social Science Edition
基金
国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“城郊土地征收中的利益分配问题研究”(21FJYB031)。
关键词
土地征收
基层政府
村干部
委托代理
基层治理
land expropriation
grassroots governments
village cadres
principal-agent
grassroots governance
