摘要
本文对财政补贴政策影响商业长期护理保险市场扩散的传导机制进行了理论分析,结合复杂网络演化博弈理论,分别构建供给侧和需求侧社会网络模型,模拟不同财政补贴政策对商业长期护理保险供需双方微观决策的影响以及宏观市场扩散情况。仿真结果表明,基于供需两侧的四种财政补贴政策的作用机制不同,产生的影响效果各异。两种基于供给侧的财政补贴政策均干预了市场竞争秩序:保单创新补贴政策能够激励供给主体优化保单的积极性,降低保费水平,推动供给主体多元化发展;营销创新补贴政策提高了市场进入壁垒,不利于供给主体数量增长,营销创新补贴越高,对商业长期护理保险市场扩散的阻碍作用越强烈。两种基于需求侧的财政补贴政策均能促进商业长期护理保险市场扩散:保费补贴政策能够大大增加消费者投保需求量,为供给主体市场扩散创造良好的市场竞争环境;差异化保费补贴在推动商业长期护理保险市场扩散上表现出更强的作用效果。本文建议:为消费者提供差异化保费补贴,补贴水平控制在5%~20%;为经营商业长期护理保险产品的保险公司提供保单创新补贴,并根据财政能力将补贴比例控制在合理范围内。
Based on the theoretical analysis of the transmission mechanism of financial subsidies affecting the market diffusion of long-term care insurance,and combined with the complex network evolutionary game theory,the social network models of suppliers and demanders are constructed respectively.Thus the paper conducts the simulation research on the effects of financial subsidies on micro-decision-making and macro-market diffusion of long-term care insurance supply and demand sides.The simulation results show that the four financial subsidy policies on both sides of supply and demand have different mechanisms and effects.Two kinds of financial subsidy policies based on the supply side have interfered with the normal order of market competition.The policy innovation subsidy policy has stimulated the enthusiasm of the supplier to optimize the policy,reduce the premium level,and promote diversified development of the supplier.The marketing innovation subsidy policy raises market entry barriers,which is not conducive to the increase in the number of suppliers.The higher the marketing subsidy,the stronger the hindrance to the diffusion of commercial long-term care insurance market.The two financial subsidy policies based on demand side can promote the diffusion of commercial long-term care insurance market.The implementation of premium subsidy policy can greatly increase consumers'insurance demands and create a good market competition environment for the diffusion of the suppliers.The differentiated premium subsidies have a stronger effect in promoting the diffusion of commercial long-term care insurance market.The paper puts forward some policy suggestions based on the above conclusions:providing differentiated premium subsidies for consumers with different wealth levels,and the subsidy level is controlled at 5%to 20%,providing policy innovation subsidies for insurance companies,and control the subsidy ratio within a reasonable range according to fiscal strength.
作者
赵娜
陈凯
ZHAO Na;CHEN Kai
出处
《保险研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第10期40-52,共13页
Insurance Studies
基金
中共中央党校(国家行政学院)全国党校(行政学院)系统重点调研课题“长期护理保险试点驱动辽宁养老服务高质量发展路径及培育对策”(2022DXXTZDDYKT019)
中共辽宁省委党校新进博士专项基金项目“长期护理保险制度赋能我国社会保障事业提质增效的作用机理与实现路径研究”(2023BSJJ023)。
关键词
商业长期护理保险
财政补贴
市场扩散
小世界网络
演化博弈
commercial long-term care insurance
financial subsidies
market diffusion
small world network
evolutionary game
