摘要
面对高昂的绿色转型成本,投机漂绿成了部分高碳企业难以抵抗的诱惑,并逐渐渗透进绿色金融领域。为了加速高碳企业开展实质性的绿色转型,本研究从金融支持的视角出发,构建由高碳企业、金融机构与政府组成的三方演化博弈模型并进行数值仿真分析。结果表明:政府严格监管和金融机构严格审核的“双严”策略以及将企业信用等级与行为挂钩的举措,均能够有效约束高碳企业的投机漂绿行为。增加金融机构的绿色金融服务声誉收益,能够激励其采取严格审核策略。政府的奖惩机制能起到良性的激励和约束作用,但惩罚效果呈现边际递减效应。因此,政府应重视提高高碳企业绿色转型的主观意愿,鼓励金融机构严格化、标准化绿色金融服务范畴,积极发挥政策引导和监管约束作用。
Facing the high cost of green transformation,speculative greenwashing has become an irresistible temptation for some high-carbon enterprises,and has gradually penetrated into the field of green finance.In order to accelerate the substantial green transformation of high-carbon enterprises,from the perspective of financial support,this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of high-carbon enterprises,financial institutions and the government,and conducts numerical simulation analysis.The results indicate that the"double strict"strategy of strict supervision by the government and strict audit by financial institutions,as well as the measure of linking corporate credit rating with their behavior,can effectively restrain the speculative greenwashing behavior of high-carbon enterprises.Increasing the reputation benefits of financial institutions in green financial services can encourage them to adopt strict audit strategies.The reward and punishment mechanism of the government can play a positive role of incentive and restraint,but the punishment presents diminishing marginal effect.Therefore,the government should pay attention to improving the subjective willingness of high-carbon enterprises to undergo green transformation,encourage financial institutions to strictly regulate and standardize their green financial services,and actively play the role of policy guidance and regulatory constraints.
作者
苏睿芯
杜建国
金帅
Su Ruixin;Du Jianguo;Jin Shuai
出处
《企业经济》
北大核心
2023年第12期139-149,共11页
Enterprise Economy
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目“双碳”目标下企业与消费者行为改变的机制与引导策略研究(项目编号:22AGL028)。
关键词
投机漂绿
绿色转型
高碳企业
金融支持
演化博弈
speculative greenwashing
green transformation
high-carbon enterprises
financial support
evolutionary game
