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论金岳霖《论道》中的“可能”观及其转变

On the Concept of Possibility and Its Transformation in Jin Yuelin’s On Dao
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摘要 “可能”是金岳霖形而上学建构中的核心概念,他在《论道》中认为凡是逻辑上不矛盾的就是可能的。金岳霖接受了马克思主义后则转而从具体条件出发去讨论“可能”。对于其“可能”观上的这一转变,可以作一种调和性的诠释。这种诠释仍然延续了金岳霖在《论道》中对“可能”的看法,即凡是逻辑上不矛盾的就是可能的,但是将问题的重心转移到是否存在逻辑矛盾的判定上,并将金岳霖后期所认为的“不可能”转化为逻辑上可能存在着矛盾来化解。 “Possibility”is the core concept in Jin Yuelin’s metaphysical construction.Jin Yuelin believes in the On Dao that it is possible that all of them are logically not contradictory.After Jin Yuelin accepted Marxism,he discussed“possibilities”from specific conditions.This article attempts to provide a reconciliation interpretation for this change of Jin Yuelin on the“possible”view.This interpretation still continues the views of Jin Yuelin in On Dao,that is,what is logically not contradictory is possible,but the focus of the problem is transferred to the judgment of whether there is logical contradictions,and the“impossible”is transferred to the“impossible”that may be logically contradictory in Jin Yuelin’s later period,so it is“impossible”to resolve.
作者 文碧方 李宝达 WEN Bifang;LI Baoda
机构地区 武汉大学哲学院
出处 《哲学分析》 CSSCI 2023年第6期28-36,190,共10页 Philosophical Analysis
关键词 金岳霖 《论道》 可能 形而上学 Jin Yuelin On Dao possibility metaphysics
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