摘要
基于跟随产品入侵和制造商创新研发策略(外包研发或自主研发),构建不同市场结构和渠道结构下的Stackelberg-Nash博弈模型,应用逆向归纳法,获得六种情形下的最优决策;进一步探讨了产品入侵对创新质量的影响,获得制造商的最优研发模式以及跟随渠道的入侵策略和领先渠道的应对策略。研究表明,在具有较强创新优势时,领先制造商通过提升质量来应对渠道入侵,增加盈利;否则,领先制造商只能通过降低价格来应对入侵,导致其利润损失。同时,与质量成本系数相反,内部创新能力可以促进制造商利润提升;两个渠道技术差异较大时,跟随水平提高可以促进领先制造商获利;而跟随制造商的利润随着跟随水平变化反复波动。渠道创新能力差异较大时,领先制造商采取外包研发模式更优,否则,选择自主研发模式更好;跟随制造商外包研发可以为领先制造商带来额外收益;跟随制造商外包研发下企业具有更强的抵御外部风险的能力,当竞争较弱时,采取自主研发可以获得更多的利润。
With the development of the digital economy,the competitiveness and influence of brands are enhanced with continuous incremental innovation of products.However,after leading firms putting new products into the market,the following firms quickly produce a variety of imitated products to compete for the limited market shares.And the encroachment of following products is becoming much more popular.According to their innovation ability,leading innovation strategy or following innovation strategy are adopted by manufacturers with different market positions to implement product innovation.As the following manufacturers encroach,conflicts between horizontal channels emerge,which leads to more complex relations within vertical channels.As a result,different research and development(R&D)strategies are adopted by leading and follow⁃ing manufacturers,i.e.,outsourcing R&D(D)or in-house R&D(C)to cope with fierce competition,which contributes to the diversified channel structures of the leading and following firms.Based on the following product encroachment,manufacturers’R&D strategies are studied under different R&D capabilities of the channels.Considering manufacturers’innovation R&D strategies and the following products’encroachment strategies,the Stackelberg-Nash game models under different market structures and channel structures are constructed.With backward induction,the equilibrium decisions and profits under six modes(i.e.,DN,CN,DD,DC,CD,CC)are obtained.Furthermore,the influence of following product encroachment,the factors of the coefficient of quality,the imitative level and differentiated innovation capabili⁃ties on quality innovation and profits are explored.Additionally,the selection of the leading and following manufacturers’R&D mode,the encroachment strategy of the following manufacturer and the deterrence strategy of the leading manufacturer are analyzed.The results show that when owning a large innovation advantage,the leading manufacturer copes with product encroachment by enhancing quality,which improves the firm’s profits;otherwise,the leading manufacturer responds to product encroachment by lowering prices,resulting in a certain loss of profit.Meanwhile,internal innovation abilities can promote the manufacturers’profits,but the quality cost coefficient has the opposite effect.When technological differences between the leading channel and the following channel are large,the increase of the following level promotes the leading manufacturer’s profits,and as the following level changes,the following manufacturer’s profits fluctuate repeatedly.When the difference in the innovation ability is large,it is better for the leading manufacturer to adopt outsourcing R&D,otherwise,it is advisable to choose in-house R&D;in addition,the following manufacturer’s outsourcing R&D mode brings additional profits to the leading manufacturer.When implementing outsourcing R&D,the following manufacturer pos⁃sesses strong ability to resist external risks,and when competition is small,in-house R&D mode can generate more profits for the following manufacturer.
作者
李春雨
张翠华
李艳婷
LI Chun-yu;ZHANG Cui-hua;LI Yan-ting(School of Business Administration,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110819,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第11期67-79,共13页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771044)
辽宁省社会科学规划基金资助项目(L20BJY006)。
关键词
创新能力
自主研发
外包研发
渠道入侵
跟随产品
质量决策
innovation capability
in-house R&D
outsourcing R&D
channel encroachment
following product
quality decision
