摘要
为了激励农产品供应链上下游企业积极实施保鲜,提出一种带讨价还价的成本分担契约,求出具体的保鲜成本分担比例,给出分担契约参数的取值依据。构建制造商和零售商双边保鲜的供应链博弈模型,分别研究没有讨价还价和考虑讨价还价的保鲜成本分担契约,通过比较二者差异,分析讨价还价对双边保鲜努力、农产品新鲜度和供应链系统利润的激励作用。研究表明,讨价还价会促进保鲜成本分担,零售商将分担更多的制造商保鲜成本;讨价还价会促进双边保鲜,提高农产品新鲜度,制造商和零售商都将投入更多的保鲜努力;讨价还价会促进生鲜农产品供应链运营,提高供应链系统利润;消费者新鲜度要求会强化讨价还价对双边保鲜、农产品新鲜度和供应链运营的激励,但是会抑制讨价还价促进保鲜成本分担的作用。
In order to encourage the upstream and downstream enterprises in agricultural supply chains to actively implement preservation,a bargaining cost-sharing contract is presented.The specific sharing proportion of preservation cost is derived,which supports the values of contract parameters.A supply chain game model for bilateral preservation between manufacturers and retailers is designed to investigate the preservation cost sharing contracts in scenarios with and without bargaining.The enhancing effect of bargaining on bilateral preservation efforts,freshness of agricultural products and the total profit of a supply chain are analyzed by comparing the above two scenarios.Through the findings,the following conclusions are made.Bargaining can promote the sharing of preservation cost,and retailers share more of preservation cost than manufacturers;bargaining can promote bilateral preservation efforts and improve the freshness of agricultural products,where both manufacturers and retailers input more efforts;bargaining is beneficial for the operation of agricultural supply chains with higher system profits;freshness requirements of consumers strengthen the promotion of bargaining in bilateral preservation,the freshness of agricultural products and the operation of supply chains,but inhibit the promotion of bargaining on preservation cost sharing.
作者
魏光兴
梁怡静
WEI Guangxing;LIANG Yijing(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)
出处
《工业工程》
北大核心
2023年第6期47-56,共10页
Industrial Engineering Journal
基金
国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(20FGLB031)。
关键词
生鲜农产品供应链
双边保鲜
成本分担
讨价还价
fresh agricultural supply chain
bilateral preservation
cost-sharing
bargaining
