摘要
在双碳背景下,我国积极推动绿电交易,但目前绿电市场仍面临着企业参与意愿不强,交易量小等问题。因此构建了购电企业和新能源发电企业两方的演化博弈模型,分析了博弈主体交互下策略的稳定性,并应用数值仿真分析探讨了模型的演化路径以及消纳比、履约率和政策激励3个因素下的策略选择。结果表明,购电企业策略最终会向购买绿电交易演化,新能源发电企业的策略最终会向参与绿电交易演化,消纳比、绿电中长期合同履约率和政府激励程度的提高均会对交易双方决策产生正向影响。
Under the background of carbon peak and carbon neutrality,China actively promotes green power trading,but the current green power market still faces problems such as the weak willingness of enterprises to participate in the market and small trading volume.To address the above problems,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model for both power purchasing enterprises and new energy power generation enterprises,analyzes the stability of strategies under the interaction of game subjects,and explores the evolutionary path of the model and the strategy selection with three factors of consumption ratio,compliance rate,and policy incentives.The results show that the strategy for the power purchasing enterprises will eventually evolve towards purchasing green power,and the strategy for the new energy power generation enterprises will eventually evolve towards participating in the green power trading,positively affecting the decisions of two trading parties with increases in the consumption ratio,the implementation rate of medium and long-term contract for the green power,and the level of the government incentives.
作者
梁晨
牛皓玮
刘达
吕海涛
LIANG Chen;NIU Haowei;LIU Da;LYU Haitao(School of Economics and Management,North China Electric Power University,Beijing 102206,China;China Energy Engineering Group Anhui Electric Power Design institute Co.,Ltd.,Hefei 230601,China)
出处
《智慧电力》
北大核心
2024年第1期23-29,54,共8页
Smart Power
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(20BGL186)。
关键词
绿电交易
消纳责任权重
政府激励
演化博弈
green power trading
consumption responsibility weight
government incentive
evolutionary game
