摘要
该文基于2007—2021年沪深两市A股上市公司的样本,检验了非控股大股东退出威胁对企业多元化经营的影响。研究发现:非控股大股东退出威胁发挥治理效应约束企业多元化扩张,主要作用机制是减少管理层在职消费和抑制控股股东掏空行为;异质性检验发现,当公司管理层持股、存在实际控制人、信息环境质量高及处于竞争性行业时,退出威胁对多元化的抑制作用更显著;拓展性检验发现非控股大股东退出威胁降低了企业非相关和相关多元化程度,且对非相关多元化的减少更显著,并提升了多元化经营价值。
Based on the sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2021,we tested the impact of the exit threats of the non-controlling major shareholders on corporate diversification.The results show that the exit threats of the non-controlling major shareholders exerts its governance function to restrict the diversified expansion of enterprises.Its main mechanism of action is to reduce the on-the-job consumption of management and restrain the hollowing-out behavior of controlling shareholders.The heterogeneity test finds that the inhibitory effect is more significant when the company’s executives hold shares,when there are actual controllers,when in competitive industries,and when the quality of the information environment is high.The expansion test finds that the exit threats of the non-controlling major shareholders reduce the degree of irrelevant and relevant diversification,and are more significant in reducing unrelated diversification,which improves the value of diversification at the same time.
作者
杨兴全
汪子君
YANG Xing-quan;WANG Zi-jun(College of Economics and Management,Shihezi University,Shihezi 832003,Xinjiang,China)
出处
《石河子大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
2024年第1期32-43,共12页
Journal of Shihezi University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“‘中国之治’的政府行为与企业创新:基于‘国家队’持股的研究”(72062027)
国家自然科学基金项目“公平竞争审查制度与国有企业聚焦主责主业研究”(72372108)。
关键词
非控股大股东
退出威胁
多元化经营
多元化经营价值
non-controlling major shareholders
exit threats
diversification
diversified value
