摘要
中央环保督察是近年来我国环保领域采取的重要改革措施,不仅有利于提高环境治理效力,而且也会对微观企业的资源配置决策产生影响。基于2012—2021年我国沪深A股上市工业企业数据,采用多期双重差分法实证检验中央环保督察对企业过度金融化的影响。研究发现,中央环保督察对企业过度金融化具有抑制作用。影响机制检验发现,中央环保督察通过提高企业绿色投资进而会抑制企业过度金融化。异质性分析表明,中央环保督察对企业过度金融化的抑制作用在融资约束程度高、高管无公职经历的企业以及处在公众环境关注度较高地区的企业更强。经济后果检验表明,中央环保督察通过抑制企业过度金融化提升了企业绩效。研究结论探析了宏观环境政策对微观企业资源配置决策的影响及作用机理,对实现环境治理和经济发展的双赢具有一定的现实意义。
Central environmental protection inspector is a major reform measure in the field of environmental protection in China in recent years,which is not only conducive to improving the level of environmental governance,but also has an impact on the decision-making of resource allocation of micro-enterprises.Drawing upon data from Chinese A-share listed industrial enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2021,an empirical examination was conducted to investigate the influence of central environmental protection inspectors on excessive financialization of enterprises by using multi-period double difference method.The result shows that the central environmental protection inspector can inhibit the excessive financialization of enterprises.The test of influence mechanism shows that the central environmental protection inspector inhibits the excessive financialization of enterprises by improving the green investment of enterprises.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the central environmental protection inspector has a stronger inhibitory effect on excessive financialization of enterprises in enterprises with high financing constraints,executives without public working experience and enterprises in areas with high public environmental concern.The test of economic consequences shows that the central environmental protection inspector improves the performance of enterprises by restraining excessive financialization of enterprises.The research conclusion analyzes the mechanism of macro-environmental policy on micro-enterprise resource allocation decision,which has certain practical significance for achieving a win-win situation of environmental governance and economic development.
作者
陈琪
王佳敏
Chen Qi;Wang Jiamin(Business School,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China)
出处
《技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第1期88-100,共13页
Journal of Technology Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目“政府激励行为下混合所有制改革的模式选择及治理机制优化研究”(22AGL017)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“中央环保督察对企业高质量发展的影响及传导机制研究”(21YJA630005)
河南省科技厅软科学项目“绿色债券发行对企业高质量发展的影响研究”(232400412036)。
关键词
中央环保督察
过度金融化
资本逐利
环境治理
多期双重差分
central environmental protection inspector
excessive financialization
profit-seeking capital
environmental governance
staggered difference-in-differences
