摘要
随着数字时代的到来,第四次工业革命的态势日渐明朗,在此背景下,人权是否会迭代为“第四代人权”逐渐成为时代之问。历史表明,工业革命中的科技迭代,并不能改变人权的前提——“人”。根据马克思对工业革命的分析,人的“类本质”不能与异化相混淆,故“人是数字存在”这一观点值得商榷。所谓的“人权迭代”思维源于“三代人权”的理论误导。“三代人权”破坏了人权的体系性,否认了人权作为体系的应变能力。在人权的整体结构中,自由权驱动工业革命的同时也伴随着异化的风险,参政权的“积极参与”功能和社会权的“国家目标设定”功能分别构成了克服异化、保障弱者的机制。这套人权架构本身就有应对工业革命保障弱势群体的强大潜力,其内核在数字时代不会迭代。因此,数字时代不会产生“第四代人权”——“数字人权”。
The Fourth Industrial Revolution,characterized by the advent of the digital age,is increasingly clear.In this context,the question of whether human rights will evolve into“the fourth-generation”is gradually becoming important.History shows that technological iterations in the industrial revolution cannot change the premise of human rights———“human”.According to Marx’s analysis of the industrial revolution,“human species-essence”cannot be confused with“alienation”,so the view that“human beings are digital beings”is worth questioning.The so-called“fourth-generation human rights”originates from the theoretical misleading of“three generations of human rights”,which destroys the systemic nature of human rights and denies its adaptability to respond technological change.In the overall structure of human rights,civil rights drive the industrial revolution while also carrying the risk of“alienation”.The participation function of political rights and the national goal setting function of social rights respectively constitute mechanisms for overcoming alienation.This human rights framework itself has a strong potential to respond to the industrial revolution,and its core will not“iterate”in the digital age.Therefore,the Fourth Industrial Revolution will not produce a“fourth generation of human rights”.
作者
路平新
LU Ping-xin(School of Law,Fudan University,Shanghai 200438)
出处
《陕西师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第1期148-160,共13页
Journal of Shaanxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
人权
数字时代
第四次工业革命
“数字人权”
“第四代人权”
异化
human rights
digital age
the Fourth Industrial Revolution
“digital human rights”
“the fourth-generation human rights”
alienation
