摘要
水利工程管理中的政企互动是一个复杂的动态演化过程,双方在交互过程中存在着相互影响。研究利用演化博弈理论,对水利工程管理中的政企互动进行研究,通过对政府管理和企业运营成本变化的分析,发现影响政企互动演化路径的因素;建立政府和企业在不同情形下的博弈模型,并对其进行数值模拟。结果表明,政府与私营企业采取策略的成本和收益、政府对私营企业消极履约行为的处罚力度是影响其策略选择的重要因素。在水利工程管理中,政府应重点关注企业的运营成本变化和处罚力度。政府应通过合理设置惩罚措施和完善监督机制来保障政企互动的稳定和有效。
The interaction between government and enterprise in the supervision of water conservancy project is a complex dynamic evolution process,and both sides have mutual influence in the interaction process.This paper uses evolutionary game theory to study the interaction between government and enterprise in the supervision of water conservancy projects,and finds out the factors that affect the evolution path of the interaction between government and enterprise through the analysis of the changes of government supervision and enterprise operating costs.The game model of government and enterprise in different situations is established,and the numerical simulation is carried out.The results show that the cost and benefit of the government and private enterprises to adopt the strategy,and the punishment of the government to the private enterprises’negative performance behavior are the important factors affecting their strategy choice.In the supervision of water conservancy projects,the government should focus on the change of operating costs and the intensity of punishment.The government should ensure the stability and effectiveness of the interaction between government and enterprise by setting reasonable punitive measures and improving the supervision mechanism.
作者
范春英
FAN Chun-ying(Shanghai Water Authority Administrative Service Center,Shanghai 200050,China;Shanghai Municipal Oceanic Bureau Administrative Service Center,Shanghai 200050,China)
出处
《水利科技与经济》
2024年第4期1-6,共6页
Water Conservancy Science and Technology and Economy
关键词
水利项目管理
政府管理
企业运营成本
演化博弈
稳定分析
water conservancy project supervision
government regulation
business operating costs
evolutionary game
stability analysis
