摘要
基于2010—2018年审计署实施中央企业审计事件样本,采用多时点双重差分模型考察国家审计对制造业企业TFP的影响效应和机制以及非效率投资的作用路径。研究发现,国家审计显著促进了制造业企业TFP的提升,这种提升主要是通过缓解代理问题和抑制高管超额在职消费发挥作用的。非效率投资在国家审计对制造业企业TFP影响过程中发挥了部分中介效应,即抑制非效率投资是国家审计促进企业TFP提升的重要作用路径。进一步地,二次审计正向调节了国家审计对企业TFP的影响效应。国家审计的促进作用在非效率投资程度高的企业中更为显著,且主要缓解了制造业企业投资不足问题。研究结论为微观企业借助审计监督力量更好实现经济高质量发展、优化审计治理机制提供了路径参考。
Utilizing a sample of audit events conducted by the Audit Office of the People s Republic of China on central enterprises from 2010 to 2018,this study employs a multi-period difference-in-differences model to examine the impact and mechanisms of national audit on TFP in manufacturing enterprises,as well as the role of inefficient investment pathways.The research reveals that national audit significantly facilitates the improvement of TFP in manufacturing enterprises.This improvement is primarily achieved by alleviating agency problems and restraining excessive managerial consumption.In the process of the national audit s impact on TFP in manufacturing enterprises,inefficient investment plays a partial mediating role,indicating that suppressing inefficient investment is a crucial pathway through which national audit promotes the enhancement of TFP.Furthermore,secondary audits positively moderate the impact of national audit on TFP.The promoting effect of national audit is more pronounced in enterprises with high levels of inefficient investment,primarily alleviating the issue of insufficient investment in manufacturing enterprises.The study s findings provide valuable insights for micro-enterprises to better achieve high-quality economic development through audit supervision and suggest a pathway for optimizing audit governance mechanisms.
作者
李丹丹
李笑迎
LI Dandan;LI Xiaoying(School of Management,Northwest University of Politics and Law,Xi'an 710122,China)
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第3期11-19,共9页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
陕西省社会科学基金项目(2023D025)。
关键词
国家审计
非效率投资
制造业企业全要素生产率
经济监督
双重差分模型
代理问题
高管超额在职消费
national audit
inefficient investment
total factor productivity of manufacturing enterprises
economic supervision
double difference model
agency issues
excessive on-the-job consumption by executives
