摘要
以中国证券市场2004—2021年A股上市公司为研究对象,研究企业家(董事长或总经理)商会关系资本与企业代理成本之间的关系,并进一步考察企业家个人声誉机制对上述关系的潜在影响。研究结果表明:企业家商会关系能够降低企业代理成本,且企业家商会任职层级越高、任职种类越多,抑制作用越显著;当企业家拥有人大代表或政协委员的政治身份以及兼任其他上市公司董事的社会身份等个人声誉时,商会关系对企业代理成本的抑制作用较弱;渠道检验发现,激励机制和监督机制是企业家商会关系作用于企业代理成本的重要渠道;进一步分析发现,企业家行业协会关系、国家及省级商会关系对代理成本的抑制作用更加明显,在非国有企业中企业家商会关系对代理成本的抑制作用更加明显。研究结论丰富和拓展了关系社会资本的微观经济后果及作用机制,为深入理解商会关系文化对微观企业决策行为的作用机制提供了初步的理论分析框架和经验证据。
Using A-share listed companies in China s securities market from 2004 to 2021,this paper examines the relationship between entrepreneurs position-holdings in commerce chambers and the agency cost of enterprises,and further examines the potential impact of personal reputation mechanism on the above relationship.The results indicate that:entrepreneurs position-holdings in commerce chambers can significantly reduce the first kind of agency cost between shareholders and managers and the second kind of agency cost between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders,and the higher the regional level of the chamber of commerce and the more types of the chamber of commerce,the more significant this effect is;When a firm has the political identity of a National People s Congress representative or a member of the Chinese People s Political Consultative Conference,as well as the social identity of a part-time listed firm,the inhibitory effect of the chamber of commerce relationship on the agency cost of the firm is relatively weak;The channel inspection found that the incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism of enterprises are important channels for the relationship between entrepreneurs and chambers of commerce to affect the agency cost of enterprises;Further analysis reveals that the relationship between entrepreneur industry associations and national and provincial chambers of commerce has a more significant inhibitory effect on agency costs,while the relationship between entrepreneur chambers of commerce has a more significant inhibitory effect on agency costs in non-state-owned enterprises.This study reveals for the first time that the relationship between entrepreneurs and chambers of commerce under the constraint of collective reputation can effectively reduce corporate agency costs,but the entrepreneur s personal reputation mechanism has a certain substitute for the collective reputation mechanism formed by participating in the chamber of commerce.The research provides a new theoretical analysis framework and empirical evidence for the in-depth understanding of the country s unique chamber of commerce relational culture on the regulation of economic development.
作者
修宗峰
王洁
龙姣玲
彭晓
XIU Zongfeng;WANG Jie;LONG Jiaoling;PENG Xiao(School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China)
出处
《审计与经济研究》
北大核心
2024年第3期75-86,共12页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目(23BJY100)。
关键词
商会关系
集体声誉
个人声誉
代理成本
社会资本
关系网络
commerce chambers connection
collective reputation
personal reputation
agency cost
social capital
relationship network
