摘要
为摸清公益型邻避设施项目的邻避冲突形成原因和避免措施,以演化博弈理论为基础,建立2个阶段演化博弈模型。第一个阶段建立当地政府与周边居民之间的演化博弈模型,探讨公众参与对公益型邻避设施选址的影响;第二阶段将环保NGOs作为第三方引入当地政府和周边居民利益博弈,探讨环保NGOs参与下的冲突协调机制。结果表明在没有外部介入下,政府与居民博弈几乎不能达到积极沟通-支持决策的结果,而环保NGOs介入调节了双方得失利益,为居民争取更多的环境效益,减少居民对抗政府行为和监督作用的角色提高了达到这一结果的可能性。
To elucidate the origins of NIMBY conflicts in public welfare infrastructure projects and strategies for mitigation,a two-stage evolutionary game theory model was constructed.The initial stage formulated an evolutionary game model between local governments and proximate communities to assess the influence of public engagement on the siting decisions for public welfare NIMBY facilities.In the subsequent stage,environmental NGOs were incorporated as a third-party mediator into the strategic interactions between local authorities and residents to evaluate the conflict resolution mechanisms facilitated by NGO participation.The findings indicate that in the absence of external intervention,the strategic dialogue between the government and residents seldom progresses towards a cooperative and supportive decision-making outcome.The introduction of environmental NGOs adjusts the balance of gains and losses between the stakeholders,advocating for enhanced environmental benefits for the residents,diminishing their oppositional conduct towards governmental actions,and bolstering the oversight role,thus augmenting the probability of reaching such outcomes.
作者
唐文魁
陈思玲
陈君丽
岳隽
Tang Wenkui;Chen Siling;Chen Junli;Yue Jun(State Key Laboratory of Urban and Regional Ecology,Research Center for Eco-Environmental Sciences.Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100085,China;Urban Planning&Design Institute of Shenzhen,Shenzhen 518028,China;Tongji University,the College of Architecture and Urban Planning of Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China)
出处
《环境科学与管理》
CAS
2024年第6期9-18,共10页
Environmental Science and Management
基金
国家重点研发计划课题“粤港澳大湾区城市群综合决策和协同服务研究与示范”(编号:2019YFB 2103104)资助。
关键词
演化博弈
公益型邻避设施
非政府社会组织机构
演化稳定策略
evolutionary game
public NIMBY facilities
non-governmental social organizations
evolutionary stable strategy