摘要
基于单个制造商和单个零售商组成的绿色供应链,考虑零售商公平关切行为,构建政府无补贴、绿色度补贴、绿色研发成本补贴3种情形下的Stackelberg博弈模型,重点分析关注零售商公平关切行为对供应链的影响,并且比较在政府补贴金额相同条件下不同补贴机制对供应链经济效益和社会福利的影响。结果表明:零售商实行公平关切行为时会降低产品绿色度、减少市场需求量,损害制造商的经济收益和社会福利;政府实施补贴机制均能提高产品绿色度、改善供应链成员利润和社会福利,但零售商存在“搭便车”行为;不同成员可能对政府补贴机制有不同的偏好。消费者、零售商和政府更倾向于选择绿色研发成本补贴机制,制造商则更倾向于支持绿色度补贴机制。
Based on the green supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer,the Stackelberg game model is constructed under three conditions:no government subsidy,green degree subsidy and green technology R&D cost subsidy,considering the retailer's fairness concern.This paper discusses how the retailer's fairness concern could affect the green supply chain and evaluates the effects of different subsidy mechanisms on the economic performance of the supply chain and social welfare under the same government subsidy amount.The results show that:retailer's fairness concern behavior can reduce the product green degree and market demand,and damage the manufacturer's profit and social welfare;the implementation of subsidy mechanism by the government can improve the product green degree,the profit and social welfare of the members of the supply chain,while the retailer has“free riding”;different members may have different preferences for government subsidy mechanisms.The consumer,retailer,and the government are more inclined to choose the green technology R&D cost subsidy,while the manufacturer tend to support the green degree subsidy.
作者
冯檬莹
邓晓燚
FENG Mengying;DENG Xiaoyi(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)
出处
《科技与经济》
2024年第3期11-15,共5页
Science & Technology and Economy
基金
教育部人文社会科学规划项目——“数字供应链网络赋能制造企业低碳转型的作用机理与路径研究”(项目编号:23A10618008,项目负责人:冯檬莹)成果之一
重庆市社会科学规划项目——“重庆智能网联汽车产业链供应链重大安全风险防范与韧性提升研究”(项目编号:2023NDYB73,项目负责人:冯檬莹)成果之一。
