摘要
国有资本收益上缴作为一项强制性分红政策,收益上缴压力会随着企业控制层级向集团内下级子公司转移。以国有资本收益上缴政策的实施为外生冲击,利用多期DID模型考察收益上缴压力下移对央企控股上市公司并购发起和并购绩效的影响。研究发现:收益上缴政策的实施显著减少了央企控股上市公司的并购发起,同时提高了并购绩效,表现为“少而优”的并购。机制检验表明,收益上缴主要通过减少行政干预和抑制管理层自利来影响央企控股上市公司的并购。异质性分析发现,非国有股东治理与收益上缴政策的影响形成替代效应,而企业ESG表现在政策影响中体现为强化效应。从企业并购视角揭示了国有资本收益上缴政策实施的微观经济效应,为通过并购手段深化国资国企改革提供了现实依据。
As a mandatory dividend policy,the pressure to contribute to the earnings of state-owned capital is shifted to the lower subsidiaries within the group along with the control hierarchy of the enterprise.The paper takes the implementation of the state capital gains handover policy as an exogenous shock and uses a multi-period DID model to examine the impact of downshift pressure of gains handover on the initiation and performance of the M&A of central listed enterprises.The study finds that the implementation of the capital gains handover policy significantly reduces the number of M&A initiations of central listed enterprises,and at the same time improves the M&A performance,which is characterized by fewer but better"M&A.Mechanism test shows that this policy affects M&A through reducing administrative intervention and suppressing management self-interest.Heterogeneity analysis reveals that non-state shareholder governance has a substitution effect on the impact of the earnings surrender policy on M&A,while corporate ESG performance has a reinforcing effect on the policy's impact.This paper not only reveals the microeconomic effect of the implementation of the policy of surrendering state-owned capital gains from the perspective of M&A,but also provides a realistic basis for deepening the reform of stateowned enterprises through M&A.
作者
王中超
余文静
王帆
WANG Zhong-chao;YU Wen-jing;WANG Fan
出处
《科学决策》
CSSCI
2024年第5期185-203,共19页
Scientific Decision Making
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(项目编号:BLX202222)
浙江省基础公益研究计划项目(项目编号:Y23G020026)
浙江省高校重大人文社科攻关计划项目(项目编号:2023GH039)。
关键词
收益上缴
并购
中央企业
企业集团
gains handover
M&A
central enterprises
enterprise groups
