摘要
本文研究下游行业获产业政策支持对客户信息披露策略的影响。研究发现,下游行业获产业政策支持,公司更可能披露客户信息,且披露内容更具体。进一步地,下游行业“进入”和“退出”产业政策名单的效应具有非对称性:“进入”显著提升客户信息披露,但“退出”未降低客户信息披露。披露策略组合分析发现,下游行业获产业政策支持,公司业绩预告更乐观,年报中客户信息语调更积极。经济后果分析发现,下游行业获产业政策支持时,披露客户信息能进一步降低公司权益成本。研究表明,公司借助政策利好积极披露客户信息,释放利好信号,降低融资成本。本研究为产业政策在供应链上的外部性提供新证据,为市场解读公司自愿信息披露策略提供启示。
This paper examines the impact of industrial policy support for downstream industries on customer information disclosure strategies.We find that,firstly,firms are more likely to disclose customer information and to be more specific when the downstream industry is supported by industrial policies.Further,the effects of“entering”and“exiting”industrial policy lists in downstream industries are asymmetric:“entering”significantly increases customer disclosure,but“exiting”does not decrease customer disclosure.Secondly,when downstream industries are supported by industrial policies,firms provide more optimistic performance forecasts and a more positive tone of customer information in annual reports.Thirdly,disclosure of customer information further reduces the firms’cost of equity when the downstream industry is supported by industrial policy.The study suggests that firms actively disclose customer information with the help of favorable policies to release favorable signals and reduce financing costs.This study provides new evidence on the externalities of industrial policy in the supply chain and sheds light on the market’s interpretation of firms’voluntary disclosure strategies.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第4期165-177,共13页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72372029、71972049)
青年项目(72102037、72002131)的资助。
关键词
产业政策
下游行业
客户信息披露
Industrial Policy
Downstream Industries
Customer Information Disclosure
