摘要
针对网约车平台之间的市场竞争问题,本文应用双边市场理论构建了双寡头博弈模型,探讨了司机端被部分覆盖和完全覆盖下的提供高低质量服务的网约车平台最优决策,分析了交叉网络外部性对网约车市场供需、双边用户最优定价及平台收益的影响。研究发现:当司机端的网络外部性较小时,两平台的最优决策为部分覆盖市场上的司机以实现供需平衡,反之应全部吸纳司机进入;高质量平台收益高于低质量平台,且不论被部分覆盖还是完全覆盖,司机端的网络外部性都对高质量平台有利。
Aiming at the market competition between ride-hailing platforms,a duopoly game model is con-structed using the two-sided market theory,which discusses the optimal decision-making of ride-hailing platforms that provide high-and low-quality services under partial coverage and complete coverage of the driver,and analyzes the impact of cross-network externalities on supply and demand in the ride-hailing mar-ket,the optimal pricing of bilateral users and platforms revenue.The results show that when the network ex-ternality of the driver side is small,the optimal decision of the two platforms is to partially cover the driver in the market to achieve a balance between supply and demand,and vice versa.Platform that provide high-quality service has higher benefits than low-quality service platform,and whether partially or fully covered,the network externality of the driver side is beneficial to ride-hailing platform that provides high-quality service.
作者
李豪
曹长慧
LI Hao;CAO Changhui(Research Center for Transportation and Economic and Social Development in Western China,400074,Chongqing,China;School of Economics and Management,Chongqing JiaoTong University,400074,Chongqing,China)
出处
《特区经济》
2024年第6期46-49,共4页
Special Zone Economy
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“共建共治共享背景下网约车市场治理的多方联动机制研究”(19XGL016)。
关键词
交叉网络外部性
服务质量差异
完全覆盖
部分覆盖
Cross-Network Externality
Difference in Quality of Service
Full Coverage
Partial Coverage
