摘要
无人驾驶的全面实现是一个循序渐进的过程,其间不可避免地会出现多形态的交通主体混行的情况。本文考虑了无信号路口处无人驾驶车辆与行人混行下的过街行为,引入了行人过路信任、无人驾驶车冲突损失溢出和行人过路信号交流等概念。从演化博弈的视角构建了双方冲突博弈矩阵,建立了双方交互演化的动力学模型,并分析得到了双方过街行为的演化稳定策略。结果表明:行人和无人驾驶车的策略选择与行人对无人驾驶技术的信任程度和无人驾驶车冲突损失溢出效应密切相关,在不同参数条件下,系统存在多种稳定均衡。此外,人车信号交流机制的引入可以在一定程度上消除由技术不信任带来的负面影响,促进博弈向目标方向演化。最后,本文通过数值模拟验证了模型的有效性,并给出了促进无人驾驶发展的管理启示。
Over recent years,traffic authorities in many countries have begun to approve autonomous vehicles for real-world road testing,and autonomous vehicles are gradually becoming one of the real travel options.However,the full realization of driverless is a gradual process,during which there will inevitably be a mixed situation of multiple forms of traffic.The most complex issue in this context is the interaction with pedestrians,a vulnerable traffic segment.Their movement trajectories are rather random and their actions are difficult to predict,which may lead to an increase in traffic accidents and cause considerable difficulties in traffic management.Considering that autonomous vehicles are different from traditional vehicles,it takes time for pedestrians to accept and adapt to autonomous vehicles,and autonomous vehicles also need to constantly update and optimize their strategies in the interaction with other traffic agents.Therefore,it is an urgent and important issue to analyze the pedestrian-vehicle interaction mechanism under driverless scenario from the perspective of evolutionary game and propose appropriate solutions to improve the traffic efficiency.Specifically,the crossing behavior of autonomous vehicles and pedestrians at unsignalized intersections is analyzed,and concepts are introduced such as pedestrians’trust of driverless,loss spillover of autonomous vehicle conflict,and communication between pedestrians and vehicles.From the perspective of evolutionary game theory,a game matrix between the two parties is constructed.Then a dynamic model of the mutual evolution was established,and conclusively the stable strategies of the two parties'crossing behavior were obtained.The results show that the strategy choice of pedestrians and autonomous vehicles is closely related to the level of pedestrians’trust of driverless and loss spillover of autonomous vehicle conflict.Under different parameter conditions,the system has multiple stable equilibriums.Besides,the introduction of the communication mechanism can eliminate the negative effects brought about by technological distrust to a certain extent,and promote the evolution of the game in the direction of the goal.Finally,the validity of the model is verified through simulation and gives management implications to promote the development of driverless.Managerial insights are provided from three perspectives:technology advocacy,media coverage and standard setting,with the aim of shedding new lights on the development of the autonomous vehicles industry.
作者
姚旭生
马寿峰
叶顺强
凌帅
Yao Xusheng;Ma Shoufeng;Ye Shunqiang;Ling Shuai(College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China;School of Management,Anhui University,Hefei 230601,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第7期138-149,共12页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金国际合作项目(72010107004)
安徽省高校协同创新项目(GXXT-2021-044)
安徽省自然科学基金项目(2108085MG237)。
关键词
人车冲突
演化博弈
无人驾驶
信任
交流
conflicts between pedestrians and vehicles
evolutionary game theory
autonomous vehicles
trust
communication
