摘要
聚焦污染双向交互影响下的跨地区环境治理,通过公众参与解决污染责任划分问题,探索基于“公众监督”和“公众受偿”的交互型跨界污染治理补偿机制。构建相邻两地、中央政府和社会公众的四方演化博弈模型,探讨多元主体的决策响应逻辑与策略均衡最优程式,并结合2018年地区数据仿真分析政策差异及优化路径。研究发现:(1)中央政策引导和相邻地区排污行为催生公众“吹哨”维权,公众高参与度促进相邻地区环境治理水平提升,随着多元治理深入,中央政府将从实施激励机制转变为实施补偿机制。(2)只有严重超标惩罚、达标奖励和吹哨奖励大于限制阈值时,才能促成相邻地区达标排放、中央实施补偿机制、公众吹哨的最优策略集合。(3)“差异化惩罚”是避免相邻地区陷入囚徒困境的必要手段,但实施效果局限于单方达标;“激励机制”打破负向约束机制的局限性,有利于促进双方达标排放;“补偿机制”推动相邻地区靶向投入治污成本并内化污染外部性,有效松解激励机制下中央的出资压力和对两地绿色发展程度的限制,优化补偿机制的关键在于降低中央政府的额外行政成本和提高社会公众的吹哨奖励。研究可为解决区域、流域的交互型跨界污染治理问题提供参考。
Focus on cross regional environmental governance under the two-way interaction of pollution,the division of pollution responsibility is solved through public participation,and the interactive transboundary pollution control compensation mechanism based on“public supervision”and“public compensation”is explored.The quadripartite evolutionary game model of the neighboring two provinces,the central government and the public is constructed,the decision-response logic of multiple entities and the optimal formula for strategic equilibrium are discussed,and the policy optimization path is simulated and analyzed based on the 2018 regional data.The study indicates that:(1)The act of the public“whistleblowing”for rights protection has been prompted by central policy guidance and neighboring areas'pollution discharge.The improvement of environmental governance in neighboring areas is facilitated by active public participation.As diversified governance deepens,the implementation of incentive mechanisms will be transformed into the implementation of compensation mechanisms by the central government.(2)However,only when severe excess penalties,compliance incentives and whistle-blowing incentives are greater than the limit threshold,can the optimal strategy set of compliance emissions in adjacent areas,central compensation mechanisms and public whistleblowing be promoted.(3)'Differentiated punishment'is a necessary means to avoid the prisoners'dilemma in neighboring areas,but the implementation effect is limited to the unilateral standard,which is broken by the'incentive mechanism',and improved to the discharge of both sides.The result of targeted investment in pollution control costs in adjacent areas and internalizing externalities of pollution is driven by compensation mechanisms,which can effectively relieve the central government's funding pressure and restrictions on the degree of green development in the two provinces under the incentive strategy.The compensation mechanism has been optimized under key measures such as reducing additional administrative costs for the central government and increasing whistleblowing rewards for the general public.This study can be used as a reference to address the issue of interactive transboundary pollution control in regions and river basins.
作者
杨志
Yang Zhi(Research Institute for Eco-civilization,Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences,Tianjin 300191,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第8期261-273,共13页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
天津市哲学社会科学规划课题青年项目(TJYJQN22-007)。
关键词
跨界污染
污染交互
补偿机制
公众参与
四方演化博弈
transboundary pollution
pollution interaction
compensation mechanism
public participation
quadripartite evolutionary game
