摘要
针对综合能源系统(integrated energy system,IES)中各主体间交互关系复杂、利益冲突显著的问题,提出了基于主从博弈的电热氢综合能源系统优化调度模型。首先,在分析氢能“产消一体化”传输特性的基础上,构建计及氢能全过程充分利用的能源生产商(energy producer,EP)模型;其次,分析EP、负荷聚合商(load aggregator,LA)及能源销售商(energy system operator,ESO)之间的价格信息交互关系,考虑负荷聚合商在需求响应机制下的资源整合效用,建立IES中各利益主体的收益模型;最后,引入“主从博弈”思想,建立以ESO为主导者,采用遗传算法和二次规划相结合的方法,对以EP和LA为跟随者的一主多从Stackelberg博弈模型进行求解。以中国北部某地区的园区IES为例,验证了该模型在促进各主体间利益均衡及共同获利方面的有效性。
The conflict of interest among entities in the integrated energy system(IES)is a challenge about operation decisions.An optimal scheduling model of electric-heat-hydrogen integrated energy system based on Stackelberg game is proposed.Firstly,an energy producer(EP)model is formulated which considers the full utilization of hydrogen energy.Secondly,the interaction of price information among EP,energy system operator(ESO)and load aggregator(LA)is analyzed.Considering the resource integration utility of load aggregators under demand response mechanisms,the payoff model of each entity in IES is established.Finally,a Stackelberg game model with ESO as the dominator,EP and LA as the followers is introduced.Genetic and quadratic programming algorithms(GA-QP)are used to solve the model.Taking a park-level IES in Northern China as an example,the effectiveness of this model in promoting the balance of interests among various entities is verified.
作者
谭玲玲
汤伟
楚冬青
李竞锐
张玉敏
吉兴全
TAN Lingling;TANG Wei;CHU Dongqing;LI Jingrui;ZHANG Yumin;JI Xingquan(Shandong Electric Power Engineering Consulting Institute Co.,Ltd.,Jinan 250013,China;College of Electrical Engineering and Automation,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266590,China)
出处
《中国电力》
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第9期136-145,共10页
Electric Power
基金
中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2023M734092)。
关键词
综合能源系统
主从博弈
氢能
需求响应
integrated energy system
Stackelberg game
hydrogen energy
demand response
