摘要
以管理层业绩预告为代表的自愿性信息披露在改善信息环境、引导投资者预期以及稳定资本市场等方面具有重要意义,但我国资本市场业绩预告披露状况并不乐观。本文立足股权结构这一独特视角,系统探讨了多个大股东并存对管理层业绩预告质量的影响。研究发现,相较于仅存单一控股股东的公司,多个大股东并存从发布意愿、频率与精度三个层面有效改善了管理层业绩预告质量。机制检验表明,多个大股东并存通过增加监督意愿与强化监督能力影响管理层业绩预告质量。异质性分析发现,多个大股东并存对管理层业绩预告质量所产生的影响在非国有企业与经济政策不确定性较大的样本中更显著。同时,以民营及机构股东为代表的非控股大股东在改善管理层业绩预告质量中发挥了主要作用,且非控股大股东类型越丰富,越有助于改善管理层业绩预告质量。本文不仅为有效提升资本市场自愿性信息披露质量提供了可行之策,还对深化上市公司股权多元化改革形成了有益启发。
Access to information is essential for the efficient functioning of capital markets.Providing timely and accurate information not only helps companies address internal and external information gaps but also guides investors in forming rational expectations and promotes long-term stability in capital markets.Voluntary information disclosure by companies,such as management earnings forecasts,is considered necessary for shaping the overall information environment of capital markets.China′s capital market has established a semimandatory system for disclosing management earnings forecasts in the past 30 years.However,the outlook regarding voluntary earnings forecast disclosure is not optimistic as it faces challenges such as low willingness,frequency of disclosure and poor quality.Therefore,it is crucial to conduct a systematic study of the factors that affect the quality of management earnings forecasts in China′s capital market.This study can help improve the quality of voluntary information disclosure and facilitate the modernization of corporate governance capabilities and systems for listed companies.In the long term,listed companies in China suffer from the structural issue of“one-share dominance,”in which controlling shareholders have absolute decision-making power in corporate governance.This has led to several inefficient governance practices.Consequently,scholars have focused on the potential impact of the coexistence of multiple large shareholders on corporate governance.Against this background,our study examines the influence and the underlying mechanisms of various large shareholders on the quality of earnings forecasts.Theoretically,the coexistence of multiple large shareholders can affect the quality of management earnings forecasts.On the one hand,the presence of numerous large shareholders can be beneficial for a company′s internal governance and management earnings forecasts.First,unlike publicly listed companies with a single controlling shareholder,the presence of multiple large shareholders strengthens the willingness of shareholders who own the company to monitor voluntary information disclosure by the management team.This helps limit opportunistic motives and self-interest tendencies demonstrated by the management in earnings forecasting,thereby enhancing the quality of earnings forecasts.Second,unlike small and medium-sized shareholders who may lack the ability to effectively supervise management opportunism in earnings forecasting,multiple large shareholders have stronger actual monitoring capabilities due to their advantageous position in terms of ownership and actual influence.This further helps improve the quality of management earnings forecasts and increase voluntary information disclosure.Third,the coexistence of multiple large shareholders escalates the costs and exacerbates the consequences associated with management opportunistic behavior in earnings forecasting,thereby compelling the management to constrain their own behavior and actually improve the forecast quality of earnings to optimize voluntary information disclosure.Conversely,it may also harm the quality of management earnings forecasts as they may have an incentive to invest substantial financial resources in the company,leading to the management′s reduced willingness to issue earnings forecasts and potentially worsening their quality.Moreover,multiple large shareholders can privately access information about the company′s future operating performance through internal communication channels,which may guide their investment decisions.Therefore,they may lack the motivation to encourage the management to disclose accurate earnings forecast information externally.As a result,the relationship between the coexistence of large shareholders and the quality of management earnings forecasts is an empirical issue.Based on these considerations,this study examines the impact and variations of multiple large shareholders on management earnings forecasts in nonfinancial A-share listed companies in China from 2010 to 2018.The study finds that,unlike companies with a single controlling shareholder,multiple large shareholders play an effective governance role in companies′voluntary information disclosure decisions.Specifically,it significantly improves the quality of management earnings forecasts,represented by improved forecast willingness,frequency,and accuracy.Mechanism tests show that the coexistence of multiple large shareholders influences the quality of management earnings forecasts mainly by increasing supervisory willingness and strengthening monitoring capabilities.A cross-sectional analysis also shows that the positive effect of having numerous large shareholders on the quality of management earnings forecasts is more pronounced in nonstate-owned enterprises and samples with higher levels of economic policy uncertainty.Further analyses suggest that noncontrolling large shareholders,represented by private and institutional shareholders,play a crucial internal governance role in improving the quality of forecasts of management earnings.In addition,greater diversity among noncontrolling large shareholders helps improve management earnings forecast quality.This study not only enriches the relevant literature on the economic consequences of multiple large shareholders in China but also expands the research perspective on factors influencing management earnings forecast behavior in listed companies.Furthermore,valuable insights are offered for promoting comprehensive diversification reforms in corporate equity in the context China′s new era.
作者
孙泽宇
常钰苑
董春晖
SUN Zeyu;CHANG Yuyuan;DONG Chunhui(School of Management,Xi′an Jiaotong University,Xi′an 710049,China;School of Business Adminstration,South China Univeristy of Technology,Guangzhou 510640,China)
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第6期58-71,共14页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(22YJC630004)
广东省哲学社会科学规划项目-青年基金项目(GD22YGL15)
广东省基础与应用基础研究基金项目-区域联合基金-青年基金项目(2022A1515110425)。
关键词
多个大股东
管理层业绩预告
自愿性信息披露
Multiple large shareholders
Management earnings forecasts
Voluntary information disclosure
