摘要
街头官僚身负“国家代理人”与“民众代理人”双重角色,在执法实践中需要同时兼顾“对上负责”和“对下负责”的双重使命。在面对必须严格按章落实政策的执行压力与响应民众需求的回应压力时,街头官僚陷入了双重压力之下的“风箱困境”。本研究探索在此种冲突性的双重压力之下,街头官僚是否会作出“亲民”的行为选择,即执行压力和回应压力能否影响街头官僚的亲社会违规行为倾向。本研究采用调查实验方法,通过模拟基层执法情境对执行压力、回应压力与街头官僚亲社会违规行为倾向之间的因果机制与调节机制进行实证分析。结果表明,回应压力能够显著影响街头官僚的亲社会违规行为倾向,但执行压力对街头官僚亲社会违规行为倾向的影响并不显著。同时,执行压力也没有显著影响回应压力与街头官僚亲社会违规行为倾向之间的关系。本研究通过模拟执法场景展开实验研究,避免了问卷调查等定量研究方法的内生性问题,并通过引入压力场景,拓展了街头官僚亲社会违规行为的研究视角,丰富了中国情境下基层执法类公务员亲社会违规行为的实证研究。
Street-level bureaucrats carry the dual roles of“state agents”and“public agents”,requiring that they balance the dual responsibilities of“accountability upwards”and“accountability downwards”in their enforcement practices.When facing enforcement pressures to strictly implement policies and response pressures to meet public demand,street-level bureaucrats find themselves in a“bellowsdilemma”of dual pressures.This study explores whether street-level bureaucrats will make pro-social behavioral choices when facing such conflicting pressures;specifically,how will enforcement pressures and response pressures influence their propensity for pro-social rule-breaking.Using survey experiments,the study empirically analyzes the causal and moderating mechanisms of enforcement pressures,response pressures,and the street-level bureaucratspropensity for pro-social rule-breaking.By simulating grassroots enforcement scenarios,the results show that response pressures significantly affect street-level bureaucratspropensity for pro-social rule-breaking,while enforcement pressures do not have a significant impact.Additionally,enforcement pressures do not significantly influence the relationship between the response pressures and the street-level bureaucratspropensity for pro-social rule-breaking.By simulating enforcement scenarios,this experimental resear perspective on pro-social rule-breaking by street-level bureaucrats and enriches the empirical studies on pro-social rule-breaking among grassroots enforcement officers in the Chinese context.The main research findings include the following two points.First,response pressures significantly affect the propensity for pro-social rule-breaking among street-level bureaucrats.When policies affect a large number of people,resulting in significant losses and carrying the risks of inciting public resistance and collective actions,street-level bureaucrats will become more sensitive to the suffering of the populace and more cognizant of the negative effects of such policies.The resultant empathy,self-imposed moral discipline,and critical spirit lead street-level bureaucrats to prioritize responding to public demands and pressures.Second,pressures from superiors to enforce policies have no significant impact on the propensity for pro-social rule-breaking among street-level bureaucrats and do not significantly moderate the relationship between the response pressures and their behavior.This implies that street-level bureaucrats are not merely rigid enforcers who follow orders and implement policies strictly by the book.
作者
黄晴
于萍萍
梁文慈
HUANG Qing;YU Pingping;LIANG Wenci(School of Political Science and Public Administration,Shandong University)
出处
《公共管理评论》
CSSCI
2024年第3期99-122,共24页
China Public Administration Review
基金
山东省自然科学基金一般项目“中国情境下基层公务员公共服务动机的测度、作用机制与政策优化实证研究”(项目批准号:ZR2022MG046)的资助。
关键词
街头官僚
执行压力
回应压力
亲社会违规行为倾向
调查实验
street-level bureaucrats
enforcement pressures
response pressures
prosocial rule-breaking
survey experiment
