摘要
分析了住房抵押贷款中借款人的理性违约,认为因住房贬值而导致的借款人理性违约,实质上是住房的价格风险在借款人和贷款人之间的重新再分配。基于对我国住房抵押贷款市场中缺乏违约风险规避机制的分析,作者提出了建立我国由政府性质的担保机构和商业保险公司共同提供保险的综合违约风险规避机制的设想。此外,就建立政府性质担保机构的问题进行了着重探讨,通过对美国联邦住房管理局(FHA)的住房抵押贷款互助保险基金(MMIF)的分析,并结合中国实际,得出了中国有必要设立政府性质担保机构的结论。
In this paper an analysis of borrower's rational default in the residential mortgage is presented. It is found that the borrower's rational default due to the depreciation of housing is actually the relocation of the risk of housing price between the borrower and the lender. Due to the absence of means for avoidance of default risk, the joint default guarantee provided by a state-owned enterprise with the commercial insurance companies is suggested. Additionally, this paper focuses on the analysis of the establishment of China's state-owned guarantee enterprise. It is necessary for China to establish the enterprise in the form like FHA's Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMIF) in USA.
出处
《重庆建筑大学学报》
CSCD
2002年第5期80-84,共5页
Journal of Chongqing Jianzhu University
关键词
住房
抵押贷款
理性违约
被动违约
违约风险规避
default of residential mortgage
rational default
negative default
avoidance of default risk
