摘要
对危机事件进行解释和问责是政府转移社会压力的有效策略。借助于对65份特大生产安全事故调查报告的内容分析,本文检验了当代中国政府事故归因和行政问责的逻辑。研究表明,中国政府采用"归因外部化"和"集体问责"政策执行主体的策略来应对特大生产安全事故的社会压力。两种策略共同塑造了社会公众对特大事故的认知框架、对中央政府的政治信任,转移了特大事故对中央政府的政治压力。但是持续采用"归因外部化"和"集体问责"策略导致安全生产管理的正向激励作用受到削弱。中央政府必须通过"再平衡"策略减小问责可能引发内部的政治分歧和冲突。这种问责结构的内在张力削弱了行政问责的效能,难以促使地方政府改进安全管理和监督效能,降低事故发生概率。
Crisis managers find ways of ending crisis in order to prevent government and political legitimacy being blemished from aftermath of destructive events. Effective strategies include applying attribution and to blame someone for their responsibility. Based on 65 investigation reports,this paper analyzed the attribution structure and blame model by Chinese government in response to Mass Serious Industrial Accidents(MSIAs). 'External-attribution' and 'Blame all the Executive Agents' are strategies applied by the central government who has the duty to manage MSIAs. These strategies construct cognitive structure and enhance the political trust and legitimacy of the public to the central government. However,those strategies encroach negative reinforcement effects to the local executive agents and engine the tension between different levels though the graded system,which do not work to promote the industrial safety management.
出处
《公共管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第4期58-70 155-156,共15页
Journal of Public Management
基金
国家社科基金青年项目(13CGL129)
教育部人文社会科学基金青年项目(11YJC630045)
关键词
归因结构
归因外部化
集体问责
Attribution Structure,the Blame Game,Blame the Subordinate
