摘要
基于非执行董事视角,在委托代理框架下,研究非执行董事的监督效应对企业技术创新的影响。研究发现:董事会成员中的非执行董事扮演了股东'代言人'的角色,对企业技术创新存在积极的推动作用;但非执行董事的治理作用,在一定程度上受到企业股权集中度和管理层权力的制约,即在股权集中程度更高以及管理层权力较大的企业中,非执行董事对企业技术创新的积极影响相对降低。拓展检验还发现:非执行董事监督与管理层股权激励存在互补效应,共同推动企业创新;由于中国民营企业的股权结构更加集中,非执行董事对国有企业技术创新的积极作用更加明显。
From the perspective of non-executive director,this study explores the impact of the supervisory effect of non-executive directors on firms’technological innovation under the framework of principal-agent.The results show that non-executive directors of the board act as shareholder'speakers',who have significant positive role in promoting enterprises’technological innovation.However,the governance role of non-executive directors is restricted to some extent by the concentration of equity in enterprises and the power of management.In companies with higher equity concentration and greater management power,the positive impact of non-executive directors on corporate technology innovation is relatively low.The expansion test also finds that non-executive directors’supervision and management’s equity incentives have complementary effects to jointly promote enterprise innovation,but due to the more concentrated ownership structure of Chinese private enterprises,the positive effect of non-executive directors on technological innovation is more obvious in stateowned enterprises.
作者
陈险峰
陈志强
李佳宾
胡珺
CHEN Xianfeng;CHEN Zhiqiang;LI Jiabin;HU Jun(Hainan University,Haikou,China)
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第8期1188-1196,共9页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(15BJY131)
海南省自然科学基金资助项目(20157257)
2018年海南省研究生创新科研课题资助项目(Hys2018-138)
海南大学科研启动项目(kyqd(sk)1905)
关键词
董事会结构
非执行董事
代理成本
企业技术创新
board structure
non-executive director
agency cost
enterprise innovation
