互惠机制对不完全契约效率的影响被引量：4

The Influence of Reciprocity Mechanism on the Efficiency of Incomplete Contract

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摘要笔者通过实施一个不完全缔约环境下的市场交易实验,研究了互惠机制对契约效率以及缔约人行为的影响,得到了两个主要结论:一是互惠机制能够显著提高契约效率,且互惠机制与可变价格契约的制度相容性更高;二是缔约人的行为表现出稳健的风险规避、不公平厌恶等社会性偏好。 In our paper,we carry out a market transactions experiment in an incomplete contracting environment and study how reciprocity mechanism can influence contract efficiency and behavior of contracting man. We obtain two major conclusions:( 1) Reciprocity mechanism can significantly improve the efficiency of contract,and it is more compatible to variable price contract.( 2) The contracting men show a solid social preference,such as risk aversion and unfair aversion.

作者袁卓群秦海英杨汇潮

机构地区南开大学经济学院

出处《经济经纬》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第4期73-78,共6页 Economic Survey

关键词不完全契约互惠机制契约效率 Incomplete Contract Reciprocity Mechanism Contract Efficiency

分类号 F062.5 [经济管理—政治经济学]

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参考文献5

1李晓义,李建标.互惠、信任与治理效率——基于比较制度实验的研究[J].南开经济研究,2009(1):101-121. 被引量：19
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5Fehr E,Hart O,Zehnder C.Contracts, reference points, and competition-behavioral effects of the fundamental transformation. Journal of the European Economic Association . 2009

二级参考文献43

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