摘要
集成商与提供商之间的信息不对称导致物流服务供应链运作效率下降,为解决这一问题,集成商需要激励提供商从信息技术及信息交流两方面展开信息共享。考虑提供商信息技术及信息交流努力程度的转化系数,构建多任务委托代理模型,研究集成商对提供商的信息共享激励策略。通过分析最优激励合同特征,提出激励提供商实现物流信息技术标准化及加强信息交流、防范机会主义风险的理论建议,为集成商做决策提供依据。
The information asymmetry between integrators and providers leads to a decline in the efficiency of logistics service supply chain,to solve this problem,integrators need to motivate providers to share information from both information technology and information exchange.This paper considers the conversion coefficient of provider information technology and information exchange effort,constructs multi-task principal-agent model to study the information sharing incentive strategy of integrators to providers.By analyzing the characteristics of optimal incentive contracts,this paper proposes the theoretical suggestions for motivating providers to standardize logistics information technology,strengthen information exchange and prevent opportunistic risks,providing basis for integrators to make decisions.
作者
卢安文
刘佳奇
Lu Anwen;Liu Jiaqi(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Chongqing 400065,China)
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第7期221-225,共5页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
重庆市高校电子商务与现代物流重点实验室开放基金项目"多供应商竞争博弈的物流服务供应链契约协调研究"(ECML201702)
关键词
物流服务供应链
信息共享
激励策略
logistics service supply chain
information sharing
incentive strategy
