利益共同体的胁迫与共谋行为:论金融监管腐败的一般特征与部门特征被引量：63

Unwilling Bribery and Collusion within an Interest Community: The General and Sectoral Characteristics of Financial Regulation Corruption

原文传递

导出

摘要本文就金融监管部门的腐败行为进行了理论和实证研究 ,通过建立监管当局与被监管对象的跨时博弈模型 ,分析了金融监管腐败的一般特征———胁迫与共谋 ,并进一步比较银行监管腐败与证券监管腐败的部门差异。文章的基本结论如下。第一 ,作为贿赂的供给者 ,金融机构存在两类行贿行为 ,一是为了开展新业务而不得不承受的监管当局设租盘剥 (胁迫 ) ,二是为了对自己的违规行为寻求监管庇护而进行的主动行贿 (共谋 )。第二 ,监管当局的受贿行为也相应分为两类 ,一是通过设租进行的贪赃而不枉法的行为 ,即行政审批中的受贿行为 ;二是通过收取贿赂而进行的贪赃枉法行为 ,即以保护违规机构所换取的个人好处。第三 ,在反腐败机制上 ,稽查、高薪养廉和严格惩处都是可取的措施。第四 ,金融监管腐败与被监管对象行为存在“下游关联”效应 ,下游被监管机构超额利润越高、违规动机越强 ,相应监管部门的腐败倾向越高 ,因而银行监管腐败与证券监管腐败存在量的不同。第五 ,监管腐败程度与监管权力介入市场的直接程度有关 ,能够直接决定融资便利的监管部门被腐败侵蚀的可能性更大 ,因而银行监管腐败与证券监管腐败存在质的差异。 This paper theoretically and empirically studies the corruption financial regulations, through an intertemporal game between regulator and financial institutions. Conclusions are following. First, unwilling bribe and collusion are two characteristics of financial regulation corruption. Second, financial regulator may set rent or offer regulation shelter for financial institutions. Third, inspection, high salary and strict penalty are feasible for anti-corruption. Fourth, financial regulation corruption is highly related to the reputation of regulated institutions. Finally, the degree of intervention on market affects the degree of corruption.

作者谢平陆磊

机构地区中国人民银行研究局

出处《金融研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2003年第7期1-15,共15页 Journal of Financial Research

基金原中国人民银行监察局与研究局合作项目<中国金融腐败指数编制与反腐败机制设计>的一部分西南财经大学中国金融研究中心金融监管研究课题的资助

关键词利益共同体共谋行为金融腐败银行监管证券监管跨时博弈模型胁迫 financial corruption, collusion, banking regulation, securities regulation

分类号 F830 [经济管理—金融学]

引文网络
相关文献

参考文献16

1Tanzi V.《世界范围内的腐败:原因、后果、范围和医治对策》[A].胡鞍钢主编.《中国:挑战腐败》[C].杭州:浙江人民出版社,1999.208—41.
2谢平,陆磊.金融腐败:非规范融资行为的交易特征和体制动因[J].经济研究,2003,38(6):3-13. 被引量：96
3Andvig, J.C., 1991. 'The Economics of Corruption: A Survey', Studi Economici, 43(1), 57 -94.
4Cadot, O., 1987. 'Corruption as a Gamble', Journal of Public Economics, 33(2), July, 223-44.
5Downs, A., 1966. Inside Bureaucracy, Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
6Lui, F. T., 1985. 'An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery', Journal of Political Economy, 93(4), August, 760- 81.
7--, 1986. 'A Dynamic Model of Corruption Deterrence', Journal of public Economics, 215- 36.
8Macrae, J., 1982, 'Underdevelopment and the Economics of Corruption: A Game Theory Approach', World Development,677 - 87.
9Oldenburg, P., 1987. ' Middlemen in Third - World Corruption', World Politics, 508 - 35.
10Rose-Ackerman, S., 1975. 'The Economics of Corruption', Jonrnal of Public Economics, 4(2), February, 187 - 203.

二级参考文献24

1张玉民.《民间借贷须正确引导》〔未发表〕[Z].,2002..
2张震宇陈明衡.《正规金融与民间信用》〔未发表〕[Z].,2002..
3Banfield, E. C., 1975, 'Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization', Journal of Law and Economics, Ⅷ(3), December, 587--605.
4Baumol, W. J., 1990,'Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive', Journal of Political Economy, 90(5), October,988-- 1002.
5Becker, G, S., 1968, 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach' , Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), March/April, 169---217.
6--,1983,'A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 371--400.
7Beck, P. J. and Maher, M. W., 1986, 'A Comparison of Bribery and Bidding in Thin Markets', Economic Letters, 20, 1-5.
8Bhagwati, J. N., 1982, 'Direct Unproductive, Profit - Seeking (DUP) Activities', Journal of Political Economy, 90(5), October, 988--1002.
9Cadot, O., 1987,'Corruption as a Gamble', Journal of Public Economics, 33(2), July, 223--44.
10Fiorentini, G. and Peltzman, S., 1995, ' Introduction', in G. Fiorentini and S. Peltxman ( eds. ), The Economics of Organized Crime,Cambridge: Cambridgs University Press.