摘要
本文研究经济改革和宪政转轨之间的关系，论证国家之间和国家内部不同政治力量间的竞争是宪政转轨的推动力量。通过对俄罗斯和中国的例证，本文分析了两种转轨模式下的特征和问题。结论是，在政治垄断下的经济转轨将被国家机会主义所挟持。经济转轨双轨制产生了宪政转轨的非常高的长期代价，大大超过它赎买既得利益平滑转型的短期好处。经济转轨是后社会主义国家的制度与WTO规则下的全球经济趋同的过程，而不是创造一个本质上不同的制度的创新过程。
This paper studies the relationship between economic reform and constitutionaltransition, emphasizing that the competition between countries and within a country is the keyfactor pushing for constitutional transition. It compares Russia and China and analyses the charac-teristics and problems of the two models of transition. The conclusion is that economic transitionwill be captured by state opportunism under political monopoly. The dual track of economic transi-tion forces constitutional transition to incur very high long-run costs that surpass the short-runbenefits obtained by buying the support of the vested interests. Economic transition of the post-so-cialist countries is a convergence to the world economy governed by the WTO rules. It is not aninnovation leading to a different set of institutions.
出处
《经济学（季刊）》
2003年第4期961-988,共28页
China Economic Quarterly
