摘要
当银行和信用社发现乡镇企业贷款项目中存在高风险项目时 ,通常不是将这些项目破产或重组 ,而是重新注资 ,允许继续运行 ,然后谎称其为安全项目。银行和信用社的逆向选择和败德行为诱发了乡镇企业预算软约束和对信贷的滥用 ,导致了大批农村金融机构资不抵债 ,最终迫使国家采取压缩贷款额度、上收贷款权限等行政措施来缓解危机。结果 ,无论好坏 ,所有的金融机构都减少了贷款发放 ,所有的项目都难以得到融资。当与银行和信用社的纽带切断后 ,依靠信贷发展的乡镇企业陷入困境也就无法避免。
The adverse selection and moral hazards of banks and credit cooperatives lead to soft budget constraint in the township and village enterprises and their abuse of loans, bring about insolvency of a large number of banks or credit cooperatives in rural areas, and at last force the regulator to alleviate the financial crisis by some administrative measures like reducing loan quotas, centralizing decision rights of loan. As a result, whether good or bad, all the financial institutions cut down loans, all projects are hard to be financed. When the ties with the banks or credit cooperatives are cut off, the township and village enterprises, which ever developed with the support of loans, inevitably fall into difficulties.
出处
《中国农村观察》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第6期2-15,共14页
China Rural Survey
