摘要
采用剩货退回合约,以偏向买方的E-SC为研究对象,对E化供应链的协调与激励进行了研究,并得到以下结论:在偏向买方的E化供应链中,供应商对剩余产品提供一定的退款率,可以使供应链得到协调,分销商(买方)总是有动机参与E化供应链,而供应商的参与动机取决于佣金率与协调机制。如果电子商务服务者收取的佣金率低于一定值,供应商(卖方)不需额外激励也会参与E化供应链;但如果佣金率高于一定值,即使分销商提供可能的最大补贴仍不足激励供应商参与E化供应链,E化供应链会因缺乏参与者而解散;当佣金率介于以上两者之间时,如果分销商(买方)从自己的获利中向供应商支付一定的补贴,仍可使整个供应链得到协调。本文的研究为E化供应链的协调与激励提供了一套具体的、可操作的、基于剩货退回合约的协调与激励方案,另外还从一个侧面反映了一些E化供应链失败的原因。
This paper studies the coordination and stimulation in buyer-oriented E-supply chain under the return contract. When the supplier in such supply chain gives the buyer a certain rebate rate to unsold products, the supply chain can be coordinated. The buyer always has the motivation to join the E-supply chain, but the supplier s motivation depends on the rate of commission and coordination mechanism. When the rate of commission is lowered to a certain level, the supplier will join the E-supply chain even without any extra incentive. However, when the rate of commission is increased to a certain higher level, the supplier will not join the E-supply chain even if the buyer offers the highest subsidy. When the situation is between the above two cases, i.e., as the buyer gives a certain amount of subsidy to the supplier, the whole supply chain can still be coordinated. The paper gives explanation to the failure of E-supply chain and proposes a practical and operable plan of coordination and stimulation in E-supply chain on the basis of return contract.
出处
《工业工程与管理》
2003年第6期1-5,共5页
Industrial Engineering and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金(70271038)
