摘要
在信息不对称的信贷市场中,当存在高、低两种不同风险类型的贷款企业时,银行如何在一定的风险限制下达到利润最大化.文中假设银行为一个上市公司,因而把其利润最大化和风险有效地结合了起来,使模型具有更实际的可操作性和现实意义.
We have studied how banks gain maximum profits under certain risk limit. In a credit market with asymmetric information. There are only two types of loan entrepreneurs at different risks: one is the high\|risk type, and the other is the low\|risk type. It is assumed that banks are listed companies and they can connect effectively the maximum profits with risks, so that the model will be more operative and meaningful.
出处
《甘肃科学学报》
2003年第4期110-115,共6页
Journal of Gansu Sciences
关键词
信贷决策机制
信贷风险
激励相容性
信息不对称
利润最大化
credit decision mechanism
credit risk
incentive compatibility
information asymmetry
maximum profit
