摘要
《中共中央、国务院关于深化国有企业改革的指导意见》等文件规定要改进国有公司董事会总经理的选任制度,但国有公司存在由于国有资本多级委托代理关系形成的代理问题,即廉价投票权问题。为控制代理问题,各国国有公司总经理形成了不同的选任模式。借鉴外国经验及结合我国实际情况,我国应从董事会、政府或国有资产监管机构的监督以及党组织的审核和监督等三个方面进行制度构建,以控制我国国有公司由董事会总经理选任中存在的代理问题。
The'Guiding Opinions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises'and other documents stipulate that the board of directors of state-owned companies should select the general manager,but the state-owned companies have the problem of agency due to the multi-level principal-agent relationship of state-owned capital,that is,the issue of cheap voting rights.In order to control the agency problem,the selection of general managers of state-owned companies in various countries has formed different modes.Drawing on foreign experience and combining with China’s actual situation,China should construct the system from the supervision of the board of directors,the government or the state-owned assets supervision institution,and the review and supervision of the party organization to control the agency problem of the general manager selected by the board of directors of state-owned companies.
作者
万国华
甘术志
Wan Guo-hua;Gan Shu-zhi(School of Law,Nankai University,Tianjin 300350,China)
出处
《政法学刊》
2019年第2期66-72,共7页
Journal of Political Science and Law
基金
国家社科基金重大项目专项"社会主义核心价值观与我国商事立法完善"(17VHJ001)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"混合所有制企业治理问题研究"(14JJD630006)
关键词
委托代理
国有公司
总经理
选任
制度
principal-agent
state-owned company
general manager
selection
system
