摘要
针对"供应链企业如何间接地通过企业社会责任(CSR)策略实现质量信息共享"这一问题,考虑一条由一个供应商、一个零售商和消费者构成供应链(其中上游供应商的产品质量信息是其私人信息),建立了供应商基于CSR这一间接信息传递方式的上游质量信号传递博弈模型,完整地刻画了不实施CSR模型下的混同均衡和实施CSR模型下的分离均衡,并利用"直观标准"选出了唯一的分离,以考察CSR在传递供应商质量信息中的角色及实施CSR信号手段的盈利性条件。结果表明在一定技术条件下,1)充分高的CSR水平能够在分离均衡意义上准确传递供应商质量信息;2)最低临界CSR水平所对应的均衡是唯一满足"直观标准"的分离均衡;3)最低临界CSR水平随着低质量供应商的CSR边际成本增加而减小,但独立于高质量供应商CSR边际成本;4)当且仅当两类供应商CSR边际成本差异充分小时,通过CSR手段来共享质量信息对高质量供应商是有利可图的。该结果一方面揭示了企业CSR行为的信号传递动机,另一方面也为企业选择直接或间接信息共享方式提供了决策参考。
Focusing on the question of how a firm in supply chain indirectly shares the product quality information via its CSR strategy,a supply chain consisting of an upstream supplier,a downstream retailer and final consumers is considered.In this supply chain,the supplier owns private information on the product quality level and tries to signal it by its CSR strategy and the supplier and the retailer transact via a wholesale price contract.Under this quality information asymmetry,in order to examine the role of CSR on signaling the quality level and the profitability conditions for the implementation of CSR mean,a signaling model is built to capture how the supplier indirectly share the quality information by its CSR strategy,the pooling equilibriums in the model when implements no CSR and the separate equilibriums in the model when implements CSR strategy are completely characterized,and a unique equilibrium is selected by the intuitive criterion.The equilibrium results show that under some technical conditions,(1)a high enough CSR level signals a high quality level in the sense of a separate equilibrium,(2)the equilibrium with the lowest threshold of CSR level is the only equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion,(3)the lowest threshold of the equilibrium CSR levels increases in the low-quality supplier's CSR efficiency,but is independent of that of the high-quality supplier,and(4)when and only when the differences between two types of suppliers' CSR marginal cost are sufficiently small,it is profitable for high quality supplier to share quality information through the CSR mean.These results reveal a quality-signaling motivation of firm's CSR strategy in a supply chain,provide supply chain managers indirect methods on sharing product quality information except the existing direct way,with an implication on choosing a direct or an indirect way to sharing information conditional on a known cost of direct information sharing.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第7期38-47,共10页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(70932005)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272129
71561008
71461005
71162017)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-11-0064)
四川青年科技基金资助项目(2013JQ0031)
电子科技大学百人计划
关键词
企业社会责任
产品质量
信号博弈
供应链
corporate social responsibility
product quality
signaling game
supply chain
