摘要
基于代理理论,将中小板上市公司分为狭义家族企业和自然人家族企业,探讨了家族所有、家族控制与家族参与管理对高管薪酬契约的影响,并与非家族企业进行比较分析。研究发现,家族企业高管薪酬水平与薪酬业绩敏感性显著低于非家族企业,金字塔结构对家族企业薪酬存在影响效应,但对不同类型家族企业的显著性不同。家族成员参与管理对家族企业高管薪酬的影响尚不显著。研究结果表明,对家族企业进行分类来探讨高管薪酬有利于解释现有研究结论不一致的现象。
Using an agency theory framework and data from listed companies on the SME board of China,we explore the effects of family ownership,family control and family involvement on executive compensation in family firms,in comparison with non-family firms. The results show that the level of executive compensation and the pay-performance sensitivity in family firms are lower than those in non-family firms. Pyramids structure exerts a significant effect on executive compensation,which varies across types of family firms. The presence of family members has no significant effects. The results further confirm the implication of exploring the executive compensation on the basis of the classification of family firms.
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第11期159-168,共10页
Management Review
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(14BGL050)
安徽大学博士科研启动经费资助项目
安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSK11-12D41)
关键词
家族企业
金字塔结构
高管薪酬
family firms,pyramids structure,executive compensation
